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ANTITRUST AND DEMOCRACY
SPENCER WEBER WALLER*
Our solution of the anti-monopoly problems must be in terms of our ideals-the ideals of
political and economic democracy. We want no economic or political dictatorship imposed
upon us either by the government or by big business. We want no system of detailedregulation
of prices by the government nor price fixing by private interests. We do not want bureaucracy
or regimentation of any kind, but we will prefer governmental to private bureaucracy and
regimentation, if we have to make such a choice. We cannot permit private corporationsto be
private governments. We must keep our economic system under the control of the people who
live by and under it. 1
I. IN TRO DU CTIO N ..................................................................................................
II. ANTITRUST AND DEMOCRACY............................................................................
III. D EM OCRACY IN A NTITRUST...............................................................................
A. Agencies and A dministrativeLaw .............................................................
1. Democracy and Administrative Law in the United States..................
2. Administrative Agencies on a Global Scale.........................................
3. Global Administrative Law and Competition Enforcement................
4. Bias, Discrimination, Due Process, Openness, and Public
Participation ........................................................................................
B . The R ole of the Executive B ranch..............................................................
C. The L egislatu re ..........................................................................................
D . The J u d iciary.............................................................................................
E. State Attorneys General and Sub-Federal Competition Agencies .............
F PrivateRights of Action and Collective Actions ........................................
G . Civil Society ..............................................................................................
IV. A TAXONOMY FOR DEMOCRACY AND ANTITRUST...............................................
V.

CO N CLU SIO N .....................................................................................................

807

808
816
817
817
821
823
82 5
827
83 1
83 4
841
844
848
854
859

I. INTRODUCTION
This article analyzes two critical and related questions regarding
the eternal quest for better understanding the purposes and tools of
competition law and policy. It first looks at the role of democracy as a
policy goal of competition policy. It also looks at the role of democracy
in the enforcement of competition law, regardless of the normative
goals of any given competition law system.
This is a timely and important topic as antitrust law has become
more politicized and is under attack in these times of populism both in
the United States and in other countries. One recent example is the
* John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law and Director, Institute for Consumer
Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to Peter Carstensen,
Christine Chabot, Harry First, Philip Marsden, John Newman, and Thomas Horton for their
helpful comments and Frances Butler for her excellent research assistance and participants
at workshops and presentations at Class Crits X; Centre for Competition Law & Policy,
Oxford University; Marquette University Law School; New York University School of Law;
University of California-Irvine School of Law; and the Global Competition Forum of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
1. Robert H. Jackson, Should the Antitrust Laws be Revised?, 71 U.S. L. REV. 575, 582
(1937).
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current concern in the United States that the Trump Administration
sought to block the AT&T-Time Warner merger because of the
President's dislike for the political coverage of his campaign and
presidency by CNN (part of Time Warner) and/or investigate Amazon
because of a similar animus to the political coverage of the Washington
Post, owned by Jeff Bezos, the owner of Amazon. It is also an exciting
time for antitrust with new cries from both the left and right to
reinvigorate antitrust as a control on the abuse of corporate power and
its corrosive effect on democratic values.
Part I examines the promotion of democracy as one of the historical
and contemporary values for competition law. Part II explores how to
promote democracy in the enforcement of competition law, regardless
of the values adopted in the formulation of that system's competition
law. Part II also examines in detail the meaning of democracy in
legislative action, agency enforcement, executive branch actions,
judicial review, private rights of actions (including collective actions),
and in civil society. Part III provides a taxonomy and hypothetical
example for democracy in antitrust, outlining how the roles of the
different actors combine to form a virtuous feedback loop. In this
feedback loop, explicit values are debated and enacted by the
democratic branches of government and society. These democratically
formulated values are then implemented by the more technocratic
branches of government. All the while, each of the parts of the system
provide feedback to the democratic branches to allow continued debate
and revisions over time. Part IV concludes.
II. ANTITRUST AND DEMOCRACY
From the earliest days of antitrust laws in the United States, the
promotion and preservation of democracy was one of the goals of the
drafters and supporters of state and federal antitrust law. While the
political content of antitrust law in the United States has waxed and
waned over the ensuing decades, competition law and policy has
always recognized the need for a pluralism of economic actors and
interests. This pluralism of economic actors and interests is similar to
the United States constitutional principles ensuring a pluralism of
governmental actors and interests through separation of powers and
the individual liberties set forth in the bill of rights.
Drafters of the United States Constitution debated, but rejected an
anti-monopoly clause.2 The drafters of state antitrust laws in the
United States, a decade before the Sherman Act, enacted detailed

2. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 983, 1009-23 (2013).
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provisions attacking monopoly.3 As state law proved ineffective in
addressing the rise of national corporations, the impetus for federal
antitrust law increased. Gubernatorial, Senatorial, and Presidential
candidates in the late 19th century often focused on the need for
stronger competition legislation and enforcement. 4 Perhaps the zenith
of this political movement was the Anti-Monopoly Party that fielded
candidates for President and other federal and statewide offices in
1888.1 In support of the legislation that would bear his name, Senator
John Sherman argued on the floor of the United States Congress:
If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any
of the necessities of life. If we would not submit to an emperor we
should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent
6
competition and to fix the price of any commodity.

Although the final text that emerged was highly general, vague,
and grounded in the common law, the country understood that a sea
change had occurred.7 Congress made three important changes to the
weak existing state common law. First, the law of competition was
federalized, although the state retained the power to maintain and
enforce their local antitrust laws.8 Second, violations of sections one
and two of the Sherman Act became a federal criminal offense,
eventually made a felony.9 Finally, the Sherman Act, and later the
Clayton Act, created a federal private right of action for treble
damages, attorney's fees, and costs for persons injured in their
business and property as a result of an antitrust violation. o
While the courts debated the meaning of the specific text adopted
by Congress in the Sherman Act, politicians and the public continued
to debate the meaning and the purpose of U.S. antitrust laws. The
Progressive Movement's concern with large business organizations
3. James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutionaland Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
495, 499 (1987).
4. Joshua Fink & Spencer Weber Waller, A Flash in the Pan: The Brief Existence of
the Anti-Monopoly Party, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE FOR
CONSUMER ANTITRUST STUDIES (2001) (on file with author).
5. Id.
6. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1889).
7. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ACT 95-99 (1965).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1(2012).
9. Over time, criminal enforcement was limited to hard core cartel violations with
violations elevated to a felony currently punishable by up to ten years imprisonment for
individual and fines up to $1 million for an individual and $100,000,000 for undertakings.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
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included a fear of such wealth and power that would put an end to
traditional American democracy." In the Standard Oil decision,
Justice Harlan's concurrence expressed these concerns in terms of the
replacement of human slavery with a new form of economic slavery to
the trusts and monopolies. 12 Following the Standard Oil decision, the
presidential election of 1912 largely was fought over the future of
antitrust law and enforcement.1 3
A generation later, U.S. antitrust enforcement was revived in the
depths of the Great Depression as a political instrument to revive the
economy, to prepare for the eventual entry of the United States into
World War II, and, in part, to distinguish the U.S. political and
economic system from the rising powers of Germany and the Soviet
Union. 14 The revival of antitrust continued with the appointment of
Robert Jackson to head the Antitrust Division.1" The revival expanded
in 1938 with President Roosevelt's famous Anti-Monopoly Message
and his appointment of Thurman Arnold to continue the expansion of
antitrust enforcement. 1 6
Following the war, the United States embarked on an aggressive
campaign of international cartel enforcement focused on the decartelization and de-monopolization of the defeated powers as part of
a post-war world international order." It is not surprising that during
the Cold War, there was a bipartisan political consensus to strengthen
enforcement of the antitrust laws, and that competition law was an
express provision of both Republican and Democratic Party platforms
until 1980.18
11.

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER

ESSAYS 200, 206, 214, 221 (1964); see also Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement:
America's Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. COMP. L. 131, 131-32 (2018).
12. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1910) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
13. See JAMES CHACE, 1912: WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT & DEBS-THE ELECTION THAT
CHANGED THE COUNTRY (2004).

14. See SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 78-110 (2005).
15. Id.
16. Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 569, 569 (2004). Roosevelt presented a message to Congress on the concentration of
economic power on April 29, 1938 in which he urged Congress to curb monopolies. Message
to Congress from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Curb Monopolies and the Concentration of
Economic Power (Apr. 29, 1938), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESS OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 1938, at 305-23 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941).
17. See GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY (1946) (case studies analyzing cartels from
World War I to 1940).
18. National Political PartyPlatforms: PartiesReceiving Electoral Votes 1840-2016, by
The
American
Presidency
Project,
U.C.
SANTA
BARBARA,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/
national-political-party-platforms [https://perma.cc/XW5U-FWE8] (last visited Aug 13,
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Against this background, Robert Pitofsky (who later became
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission) wrote in 1979, "It is bad
history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in
interpreting the antitrust laws."19 The link between market
competition and democracy is expressed in a surprising array of more
conservative voices as well. As former Secretary of State and National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice stated to the 2012 Republican
Convention in more general terms: "Where does America stand? . .
The U.S. has since the end of World War II had an answer-we stand
for free peoples and free markets . . . we will sustain a balance of power
that favors freedom." 2 0 Milton Friedman in Capitalism and Freedom
argued that political freedom depended on economic freedom. 2 1 Robert
Bork in The Antitrust Paradox recognized that "antitrust is a
subcategory of ideology" necessarily connected to "the central political
and social concerns of our time." 2 2 Most recently, Senator Orrin Hatch
spoke on the floor of the Senate:
Little surprise, then, that in America's free enterprise tradition, no
less than in its larger political tradition, we deeply distrust
concentrated power. We distrust the intervention of the state, to be
sure. Our system is largely defined by limited government. But so
too do we cast a wary eye upon powerful private entities. We have
little tolerance for the monopolist which secures its market position
anti-competitively, and we offer no quarter to the naked cartel. In
other words, we no sooner trust concentrated private power than
concentrated public power to dictate the direction of our economy.23
Outside the United States, issues of competition law also have been
intertwined with debates about political freedom and democracy.
Competition law in Europe represents a combination of distinctly

2019) (compiled list of the political platforms of each party in each U.S. Presidential election
from 1840 until 2016 with hyperlinks to descriptions of each party's platform); see also N.
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("The Sherman Act was designed to ...
[provide] an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions").
19. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051
(1979).
20. Condoleeza Rice, Former Secretary of State, Speech at the Republican National
Convention, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
rnc-2012-condoleezza-rice-delivers-speech-to-republican-national-convention-in-tampa-fulltext/2012/08/29/334d8122-f224- le 1-892d-bc92fee603a7_story.html?noredirect=on&
utmterm=.304bc5f385c [https://perma.cc/872Q-48WE].
21. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 8 (1962).
22. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 408 (2d
ed. 1993).
23. Press Release, Hatch Speaks Again on Hipster Antitrust,'DelrahimConfirmation,
PUBLIC
(Sept.
25
2017),
http://www.publicnow.com/view/95AC914914FE72F2690
C1E2A6FC18CF421D27453 [https://perma.cc/NV9H-4264].
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national impulses in the early years of the twentieth century reflecting
different visions of political economy.2 4 The ordoliberal project both
before and after World War II embodies a desire to embed controls of
both political and economic power in a constitutional legal structure.
Two recent scholars have noted the direct link between competition
and democracy as the normative underpinnings for European Union
(EU) competition law.2 5
The EU includes a variety of economic and political goals of its
treaty provisions and its case law, such as the single market
imperative and the special responsibility of dominant firms. 2 6 The
wholesale adoption of competition law around the world following the
collapse of the Soviet Union represents a ringing declaration of the
importance of the economic freedoms embodied in competition law, as
countries went through both political and economic transformation. 27
Similarly, the adoption of meaningful competition law in South Africa
was part of the democratization of the country in the post-apartheid
era. 2 8

The debate over the goals of competition law has continued and
strengthened in contemporary times. Scholars both old and new argue
for more than a thin diet of efficiency, defined as wealth maximization,
as the animating principle of competition law. 2 9 Economists from the
24. See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998).

&

25. Elias Deutscher & Stavros Makris, Exploring the ordoliberal paradigm: The
competition-democracy
nexus,
EUI
Working
Papers,
LAW
2017/03,
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/45291/LAW_2017_03.pdfsequence=2
[https://perma.cc/VP7D-UEVY].
26. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47,
superseding Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 Mar. 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3; see Commission Decision 1/2003 of June 27, 2017 relating to proceedings under
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the
Agreement on the European Economic Area (AT. 39740 - Google Search (Shopping)) at ¶ 331,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decdocs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M327-ZCME] (discussing special responsibility of dominant firms).
27. Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the InternationalHarmonization of Law:
Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 558, 582-90 (1994).
28. Trudi Hartzenberg, Competition Policy and Practice in South Africa: Promoting
Competition for Development, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 667, 667 (2006) (explaining that new
competition policy was drafted in the post-apartheid regime as part of South Africa's new
democratic regulatory reforms).
29. For a representative cross section of such scholars, see Jonathan Baker,
Competition Policy as PoliticalBargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 484 (2006); Thomas Horton,
Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values, 16 U.N.H. L. REV. 179 (2018); Marina Lao, Ideology
Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 653 (2014); Allen P. Grunes
Maurice E. Stucke, Plurality of Political Opinion and the Concentration of the Media, in
GENERAL

REPORTS OF

THE

XVII CONGRESS

OF

THE INTERNATIONAL

ACADEMY

OF

COMPARATIVE (Karen B. Brown & David V. Snyder eds., 2012); Eleanor M. Fox, The
Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008);
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University of Chicago have begun an annual conference to examine the
negative effects of increased concentration in the economy.3 0 The
media has increased coverage of issues of economic inequality and the
abuse of power.3 1 Both presidential candidates in the 2016 election
and other political leaders recently have addressed themes of excessive
economic concentration and power.3 2 Most recently, the Democratic
Party has called for increased merger enforcement and enforcement
against dominant firms as a centerpiece of its current political
agenda.33 Scholars have sought to deploy new and existing theories in
Harry First, Antitrust's Goals: Theories of Antitrust in the United States and Japan, in
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 175 (Clifford A Jones & Mitsuo
Matsushita eds., 2002); NeilW. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer ProtectionLaw, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997); Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 65, 68-69 (1982).
30. The University of Chicago Worries About a Lack of Competition, THE ECONOMIST:
THE
SCHUMPETER
BLOG
(Apr.
12,
2017), https://www.economist.com/business/
20 17/04/12/the-university-of-chicago-worries-about-a-lack-of-competition
[https://perma.cc/
N8KQ-LHLG]; Conference Agenda, Stigler Centerfor the Study of the Economy and the State:
Is There a Competition Problem in America?, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO BOOTH SCHOOL
OF BUSINESS (Mar. 27-29, 2017), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/singleevents/march-27-2017 [https://perma.cc/4JTL-ZF9Z].
31. Data is Giving Rise to a New Economy, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
https://www. economist.com/briefing/2017/05/06/data-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy
[https://perma.cc/JU8R-YB66]; The World's most Valuable Resource is no Longer oil but data,
THE ECONOMIST, (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worldsmost-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data
[https://perma.cc/MM8-QZ8Q];
Linda
Kahn & Sandeep Vaheesan, How America Became Uncompetitive and Unequal, THE
WASHINGTON POST (June 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/howamerica-became-uncompetitive-and-unequal/2014/06/13/a690ad94-ecOO- 1 1e3-b98c72cef4a00499_story.html?utmterm=.38lea4b2dfe [https://perma.cc/HM63-P7G4]; Stacy
Mitchell, The Rise and Fall of the Word 'Monopoly" in American Life, THE ATLANTIC (June
20,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/word-monopolyantitrust/530169/ [https://perma.cc/42KS-A4BA]; Gillian B. White, Escaping Poverty
Requires Almost 20 Years With Nearly Nothing Going Wrong, THE ATLANTIC (April 27, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/economic-inequality/5246 10/
[https://perma.cc/6DXQ-6FK3].
32. Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Keynote Remarks at New America's Open Market
Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy (June 29, 2016),
https://www.warren. senate. gov/files/documents/2016-6-29_Warren Antitrust Speech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TV5-EZEY]; Barry C. Lynn, America's Monopolies are Holding Back the
Economy, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2017/02/antimonopoly-big-business/514358/ [https://perma.cc/PE77-LCGW]; Brian
Naylor, Presidential Campaigns Blast AT&T-Time Warner Merger, NPR (Oct. 24, 2016,
11:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/24/499152454/presidential-campaigns-blast-at-ttime-warner-merger [https://perma.cc/2B5W-26ZG]; Hillary Clinton's Vision for An Economy
Where Our Businesses, Our Workers, and Our Consumers Grow and Prosper Together,
ENEWS PARK FOREST (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.enewspf.com/national-news/latestnational-news/hillary-clintons-vision-economy-businesses-workers-consumers-growprosper-together/ [https://perma.cc/G63U-34KW].
33. Chuck Schumer, Chuck Schumer: A Better Deal for American Workers, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (July 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/opinion/chuck-schumeremployment-democrats.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A8QV-PVHK].
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order to deal with new issues of monopolization and abuse of a
dominant position in the information and social media age.3 4
Professor Harry First and I examined the democratic
underpinnings of antitrust law in our 2013 article Antitrust's
Democracy Deficit.35 In that article, we explained how the dramatic
decrease in "antitrust's political salience," until very recently, affected
the "antitrust enterprise," and "connect[ed] this shift to our concern for
the political values that we believe underlie" all forms of competition
law.3 6 "We connect[ed] free markets with free people, favoring open
markets, . . . the opportunity to compete, ... [and] . . the connection
between free markets and democratic values and institutions."3 7 We
also argued that "a balance of institutional power is necessary to
advance the goals that free markets embody."3 8
We characterize [d] the result of this shift toward technocracy as
antitrust's democracy deficit .

.

. draw[ing] upon the concept of a

democracy deficit from the literature analyzing and critiquing the
European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The term has generally been used to refer to policymaking by
unaccountable and nontransparent technocratic institutions far
removed from democratic (or national) control.... The concern for
democratic decision-making has also been reflected in a new interest
in global administrative law and the importance of basic principles
of transparency and due process as a way to control the
administrative state. This interest in administrative law principles
has likewise led to a closer examination of how well antitrust
conforms to due process and institutional norms.
Our concern over antitrust's move away from more
democratically controlled institutions toward greater reliance on
[unaccountable] technical experts [was] not just animated by a
theoretical preference

for democracy.

. . . A preference

for

democratic
institutions
implicitly
assumes
that
more
democratically arranged institutions will, in general, produce
preferable antitrust policies and outcomes. We think this is
particularly true today, when the imbalance between democratic
control and technocratic control has put antitrust on a thin diet of

34. See, e.g., MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION
POLICY (2016); ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE
AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016).
35.
L. REV.
36.
37.
38.

Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM
2543 (2013).
Id. at 2543-44.
Id. at 2544.
Id.
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efficiency, one that has weakened antitrust's ability to control
corporate power.39

"[C]oncern about a democracy deficit does not lead to a full-throated
embrace of . .. populism" in either its historical or more contemporary
form. 4 0 One scholar has recently characterized antitrust populism as
emphasizing social divides by using exaggerated claims. 41 He goes on
to describe both a historical liberal strain of antitrust populism that is
pro small business, and a more recent dominant conservative populist
strain that questions the efficacy of antitrust itself.4 2
In Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, Harry First and I express our
favoring of antitrust enforcement conducted by knowledgeable and
committed public servants deciding cases in accordance with the law
and due process, rather than directly by public opinion or the ballot
box. 4 3 "Rather, we think that by redressing the democracy deficit we
can move the needle back toward policies that reflect more general
political understandings and views of antitrust policy." 44 These policies
would improve the institutions and outcomes for antitrust law in the
process. 45
First and I began our Article, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, by
charting the democracy deficit as shown through the conduct of the
major antitrust system institutions, such as the courts, Congress, and
public enforcers and by comparing the state of antitrust enforcement
in the United States with the evolving enforcement regime found in
Europe. 4 6 Second, we examined the link between technocracy and
ideology, in particular, how a technocratic approach supports a radical
laissez-faire ideology for antitrust enforcement. 47 First and I concluded
our article with our thoughts on why antitrust would benefit from
increased democracy. 4 8
This article expands on that work in an important way. The
question of whether and how the promotion of democracy is an
instrumental goal of antitrust law is an important one. There is an
equally important issue of how antitrust can be enforced in a
democratic manner (reflecting the values of a democratic market based
39.
40.

First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2544-45.
See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox & Harry First, America-FirstAntitrust, 2 CPI ANTITRUST
CHRONICLE
17
(Feb.
2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/02/AC-feb-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/99TC-9SEH].
41. Barak Orbach, Antitrust Populism, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 2, 7-11 (2017).
42. Id. at 16-17.
43. First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2545.
44. Id. at 2546.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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society, as is the case in the countries belonging to the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development) regardless of which
values any particular individual or society believes are paramount in
the antitrust laws themselves. That is the issue discussed below.
III. DEMOCRACY IN ANTITRUST
As Professor First and I stated in Antitrust's Democracy Deficit:
The institutional aspects of today's antitrust enterprise . . . are
increasingly out of balance, threatening the democratic, economic,
and political goals of the antitrust laws. The shift that [Richard]
Hofstadter first described has led to an antitrust system captured
by lawyers and economists advancing their own self-referential
goals, free of political control and economic accountability. Some of
this professional control is inevitable, of course, because antitrust is
a system of legal ordering of economic relationships. But antitrust
is also public law designed to serve public ends. Today's unbalanced
system puts too much control in the hands of technical experts,
moving antitrust enforcement too far away from its democratic
roots.49

In that article, we began the conversation of what an expert, but
democratic, form of competition would mean for the main institutional
players in our field, namely:
1) the legislatures that enact and oversee the law;
2) the public agencies that investigate and enforce the law;
3) the executive branches that execute the competition laws as
part of a broader array of responsibilities;
4) private litigants and sub-federal enforcement agencies;
5) the judiciary, which decides trials and appeals of both public
and private antitrust litigation; and
6) civil society. 0
This article expands that framework with a more in depth analysis
of the institutions of competition law from the perspective of how these
different institutions support or push back against democratic values.
Two caveats before proceeding further. First, while most of the
specific examples are drawn from the experience of the United States,
and to a lesser extent the EU and its member states, the overarching
principles remain applicable to analyzing whether any given
jurisdiction's competition law system exhibits a greater or lesser
democracy deficit. Second, while my co-author and I both believe that
the promotion of democracy should be an express value of competition
law, this portion of the article is agnostic to that debate. Whether one
49. First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2544.
50. Id. at 2546-67.

2019]

ANTITR UST AND DEMOCRACY

8 17

believes that democracy, wealth transfer, consumer choice, efficiency,
or something else should be the sole goal, the primary goal, one goal
among many, or a minor aspect of competition policy, there is a still a
pressing need that the resulting law and policy are enforced in a
democratic manner that ensures due process, non-discrimination, and
transparency.
A. Agencies and Administrative Law
The role of administrative agencies in a democracy has been an
issue in the United States since the creation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1887. Both in the United States and abroad,
the control of governmental agency power is traditionally within the
domain of administrative law. In U.S. competition law, this is
complicated by the fact that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is
an independent administrative agency, while the Justice Department
Antitrust Division is a part of the Executive Branch." Nonetheless,
the principles of administrative law in the United States and abroad
are helpful for creating a vocabulary for analyzing the nature and
degree that competition law and policy within an enforcement agency
comports with democratic principles.
This section first reviews traditional U.S. scholarship on how to
ensure the democratic nature of administrative agencies. Part Two
looks at the growing field of global administrative law and includes a
checklist of values that any competition agency must consider in
enforcing the law. Part Three examines the growing movement toward
global administrative law and its relations to competition
enforcement. Part Four concludes with a discussion of bias,
discrimination, due process, transparency, and public participation in
the work of competition agencies.
1. Democracy and Administrative Law in the United States
In his 1946 article, The Responsibility of Administrative Officials in
a Democratic Society, David M. Levitan notes that the quest for
discovering techniques to keep administrative bodies responsive to the
public has "disturbed students of democratic government."5 2 Levitan
notes that external controls over administrative bodies-such as
dismissal authority, judicial review, senate confirmation authority,

51. Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1391, 1394-95 (1998).
52. David M. Levitan, The Responsibility of Administrative Officials in a Democratic
Society, 61 POL. SCI. Q. 562, 581 (1946). See generally KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §2.3 (2008).
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and Congressional investigations-are alone not the solution to
problems of unhindered administrative control.53
According to Levitan, external controls are important, but
achieving a responsible bureaucracy also includes the development of
internal controls.5 4 Internal controls ensure that administrative
professionals are aware of their role in a democratic system and are
dedicated to the achievement of a democratic agency. 5 Levitan states
that the bureaucracy can be made more responsible to the public
where: the base of recruitment for positions is widened, training of
such officials includes training in social and economic ideas, civil
liberties granted to citizens are guaranteed for officials and
government employees, and agencies consist of non-career
professional public servants who are dedicated to the policies of the
administration.5 6
Robert S. Lorch in his 1980 book, Democratic Process and
Administrative Law, also addresses whether and how administrative
rule-making can be made democratic. 57 Lorch lists techniques for
making administrative rule-making democratic including: notice of
proposed rules, the opportunity to present views, the legislative veto,
deferred effectiveness and publication, and judicial review.5 8 According
to Lorch, notice is central to democratic administration, because if the
public is to participate in rule-making, they must have notice that such
rule-making is taking place.5 9 Lorch goes on to list the right to petition,
consultation and conference with interested persons, and hearings as
devices that allow for the presentment of public views in
administrative agencies.6 0 He also discusses three additional
techniques for democratic administration: 1) agencies should be
encouraged to keep a public docket, 2) agencies should be encouraged
to utilize rule-making for policy formulation rather than adjudication,

53. Levitan, supranote 51, at 581.
54. Id. at 581-82.
55. Id. at 582.
56. Id. at 582-83.
57. ROBERT S. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 101-14
(Wayne State University Press ed., rev. ed. 1980).
58. Id. Lorch's book was written before the United States Supreme Court's decision in
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which found the legislative veto unconstitutional.
59. Lorch, supra note 56, at 101; see also Donald J. Kochan, The Commenting Power:
Agency Accountability Through PublicParticipation,70 OKLA. L. REV. 601 (2018) (describing
commenting power as critical to our Republic). For a broader view of a more democratic
administrative process see K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2017).
60. LORCH, supra note 56, at 105-07.
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and 3) where adjudication is relied on for policy formation, there
should be periodic codification of policy.61

In his 1990 article, The American Administrative State: The New
Leviathan, A.M. Gulas discusses how each of the three branches of the
United States government respectively check the power of
administrative agencies. 62 Beyond the now unconstitutional legislative
veto, Gulas suggests that Congress can still ensure accountability of
administrative agencies by writing the statues granting agency power
with greater specificity. 63 Greater specificity in drafting statutes would
provide the agencies with less discretion in carrying out their
mandates, which helps to eliminate arbitrariness and inequality in
agency decisions. 6 4 As Gulas states, the legislature has methods, such
as statutory override, joint resolutions, limitation or removal of agency
jurisdiction, as well as indirect devices, such as "committee vetoes,
critical oversight hearings, and limitation on appropriations" that
allow the legislature to monitor agency action.65 Additionally, the
judiciary has the important power of judicial review over
administrative decisions, which serves as a further check on agency
action.6 6

Gulas cites the executive branch's power over administrative
agencies as "politics in action." 67 The executive checks administrative
agencies through "powers of appointment and removal from office of
top administrators, direction of policy within statutory boundaries,
and organization or reorganization of agency power."6 8 Gulas also cites

the executive's power of the purse as the "single most effective control
. . over the administrative state."69
Giandomenico Majone discusses many of these same issues in
analyzing Europe's democracy deficit in Europe's 'DemocracyDeficit':
70
In particular, Majone discusses how the
The Question of Standards.
United States ensures that administrative agencies remain
61. Id. at 114.
62. A.M. Gulas, The American Administrative State: The New Leviathan, 28 DUQ. L.
REV. 489, 504 (1990).
63. Id. at 505. Gulas notes, however, the practical inefficiencies in narrowly tailoring
agency discretion in statutes. Id. In particular, this could result in a "screetching halt" in
lawmaking due to the level of specificity that would go into each piece of legislation. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Gulas, supranote 61, at 506-07.
67. Id. at 506-07, 509.
68. Id. at 509-10.
69. Id. at 510.
70. Giandomenico Majone, Europe's Democracy Deficit': The Question of Standards, 4
EUR. L.J. 5 (1998).
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accountable despite their independence.7 1 Agencies are created by
congressional statutes; which are created and maintained by elected
officials, who appoint the agency employees. 7 2 Agency discretion is also
limited by procedural requirements, such as those imposed by the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 7 3 The APA provides for control
over agency rule-making by requiring agencies to provide notice of
rules and opportunity for comment.7 4 Lastly, the United States
controls administrative agencies by allowing judicial review of
administrative rule-making and adjudication.7 5
Kenneth Warren in his 2010 book, Administrative Law in the
Political System, focuses on legislative attempts to keep
administrative agencies democratically accountable.7 6 Warren cites
three traditional powers of Congress that provide oversight on
administrative agencies.7 7 These powers are to create and organize
agencies, to control agency budget, and to investigate agency
activities. 7 8 The power to create provides Congress, a democratic body,
with the ability to create controllable administrative agencies. 7 9
Congress exercises control by: limiting agency jurisdiction, attaching
appropriation ceilings to prevent expansion, establishing specific
procedural steps for policy implementation, limiting agency discretion,
and by clearly laying out policy goals and expectations. 8 0
Congress further controls administrative agencies through
authorization committees that establish the agencies and engage in
further statutory review of the programs. 8 1 These committees have five
specific
watchdog
powers
over
agencies:
authorization;
reauthorization; amending the agencies' structure, powers, and
programs; confirming appointments; and conducting investigatory
research. 8 2

71. Id. at 18-28.
72. Id. at 18-20.
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 105-56
(Westview Press ed., 5th ed. 2011).
77. Id. at 109.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 111.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. WARREN, supra note 75. Warren also names the legislative veto as a watchdog
power of Congress, but notes that in the U.S. this power was ruled unconstitutional by the
Chadha decision. Id. at 112, 115 (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)).
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Warren also notes that Congress exercises control over
administrative agencies through general guidance legislation. 83 The
main guidance legislation passed by Congress that promotes
democracy in administrative agencies is the APA. 8 4 There are many
features of the APA that are aimed at making the administrative
process more democratic, such as: publicity of proposed procedures and
activities of agencies, demanding that agencies keep adequate records
in case of appeal, providing for appellate review, creating independent
administrative law judges (ALJs) to better ensure impartial hearings,
allowing for judicial review, limiting unnecessary discretion, and
others.85 Warren also cites the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as
an important Congressional control over administrative agencies,
because disclosure of information to interested parties is consistent
with democratic theory.8 6
Lastly, Warren cites Sunshine and Sunset legislation as allowing
Congress to exercise control over administrative agencies. 87 Sunshine
laws "allow the sun to shine" on meetings where important public
policy decisions are being made.8 8 Preventing these meetings from
happening behind closed doors can make administrative decision
making more democratically accountable.8 9 Sunset laws require
agency evaluation at set intervals in order to ascertain whether their
financial support should be continued.90 This review allows legislators
to scrutinize agencies at regular intervals to determine whether the
agencies are performing satisfactorily, need to implement changes, or
be terminated.9 1
2. Administrative Agencies on a Global Scale
One of the most interesting recent scholarly developments has been
the emergence of the global administrative law (GAL) field. 9 2 The
83. Id. at 109.
84. Id. at 129.
85. Id. at 129-30.
86. Id. at 131.
87. WARREN, supra note 75, at 138-42.
88. Id. at 138.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 141.
91. Id.
92. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005); see also
Benedict Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law and Deliberative Democracy, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 526 (Florian Hoffmann and Anne Oxford
eds., 2016); Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Administrative Law in the
InstitutionalPracticeof Global Regulatory Governance, 3 WORLD BANK LEGAL REV. 3 (2012);
Benedict Kingsbury & Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law Dimensions of

822

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:807

purpose of the Global Administrative Law Research Project at New
York University School of Law is to systematize studies in diverse
national, transnational, and international settings to work toward an
embryonic field of global administrative law. 93 The introduction to a
leading symposium defines this nascent field as: "[T]he mechanisms,
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative
bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of
transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by
providing effective review of the rules and decisions they make." 9 4 In
addition to familiar issues of procedural participation and
transparency, Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B.
Stewart discuss substantive standards of proportionality, means-end
rationality, avoiding unnecessarily restrictive means, protecting
legitimate expectations, and the existence of immunities with special
regimes for special issues and actors.95
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart also examine the normative bases
of global administrative law.9 6 The authors note that while systems
vary in their means of ensuring democracy in administrative law, all
jurisdictions are concerned about democracy. 97 Some jurisdictions
implement democracy in administrative agencies by ensuring
adherence to statutes and providing transparency and public
participation in rule-making.9 8 For example, in the U.S. there are
judicially enforced obligations for agencies to consider affected
interests and to provide justifications for their policy decisions that

&

InternationalOrganizationsLaw, 6 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 319 (2009); Nico Krisch & Benedict
Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the
InternationalLegal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2006); Benedict Kingsbury, et al., Foreword:
Global Governance as Administration National and TransnationalApproaches to Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer/Autumn 2005); Benedict
Kingsbury, Omnilateralism and Partial InternationalCommunities: Contributions of the
Emerging Global Administrative Law, 104 J. INT'L L. & DIPL. 98 (2005); Richard Stewart,
The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
POL. (2005); Nico Krisch, The Pluralismof Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. OF INT'L.
L. 247 (2006); Nico Krisch, GlobalAdministrative Law and the ConstitutionalAmbition (LSE
Legal
Studies
Working
Papers
10/2009,
2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1491608 [https://perma.cc/L7VJ-5ASK]; Richard Stewart, U.S.
Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
63 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
93. Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, supra note 91, at 5.
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id. at 37-42.
96. Id. at 42.
97. Id. at 48.
98. Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, supra note 91,
at 48.
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include responses to public comments.99 Other jurisdictions rely on
executive controls, administrative law procedures, and/or judicial
review to ensure democratic control by administrative bodies. 00
3.

Global Administrative Law and Competition Enforcement

The GAL Project uses the following questions as a way of testing
national and transnational administrative regimes:
"Were these international systems of governance accountable and
legitimate?
Were the procedures and outputs fair? transparent? Predictable?
[sic]
Were the decision-makers sufficiently expert?
Were the systems efficient?
How should they be assessed?
Are there benchmarks by which the new institutions of governance
can be evaluated?" 101
The main application of the global administrative law project in the
competition field has been the volume The Design of Competition Law
Institutions: Global Norms, Local Choices.1 0 2 It consists of nine
descriptive chapters of the various national and regional competition
agencies, evaluating those powers and procedures according to the
criteria of the GAL project.103 For example, Professors Fox and First
and practitioner Daniel E. Hemli authored the descriptive chapter on
the United States, laying out the criteria of U.S. practice according to
the common template applied in the book. 1 0 4
Some of the best work directly examining democracy in competition
law design outside of the GAL project came from two distinguished
Canadian professors at the University of Toronto law school, one an

99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Design of CompetitionLaw Institutions

and the Global Convergence of ProcessNorms: The GAL Competition Project 1 (N.Y.U. Law
&
Econ.
Research
Paper
Series
Paper
No.
304,
2012),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2128913
[https://perma.cc/GSD888Y2].
102. THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS: GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES
(Michael J. Trebilcock and Eleanor M. Fox eds., 2013).
103. Id.
104. Harry First, Eleanor M. Fox, & Daniel F. Hamli, The United States: The

Competition Law System and Country's Norms, in THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW
INSTITUTIONS: GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES 329 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock
eds., 2013).
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economist and one a lawyer. In two different articles, Edward M.
lacobucci and Michael J. Trebilcock specifically address the design of
competition law institutions in a way that provides a vocabulary for
agency officials and commentators to assess the values and structures
of competition agencies.10
In both articles, the authors outline five questions that any
competition policy regime must address:
1) "who investigates and initiates proceedings;"
2) if investigation and enforcement are "undertaken by the
government,
which branch of the government is
responsible;"
3) "what
body
adjudicates
contested
competition
proceedings;"
4) "to what extent is there judicial review of competition
[policy] decisions;" and lastly,
5) "what role, if any, is there for political review by elected
officials of competition agency decisions." 106
The authors subsequently lay out normative criteria for evaluating
competition law agencies 0 7 that involves the balancing of ten values.10 8
The first is a balancing between agency independence and agency
accountability.10 9 Next, competition law agencies must balance
expertise with detachment from the industry.110 Competition law
agencies must also balance transparency and confidentiality in
handling highly sensitive commercial information.' Balancing
between administrative efficiency and due process is also necessary,
as many matters are time sensitive, but all interested parties must
still be afforded a right to be heard, to introduce evidence, and to

105. Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Designing Competition Law
Institutions: Values, Structure, and Mandate, 41 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 455, 457 (2010)
[hereinafter "Values, Structure, and Mandate"]; Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M.
lacobucci, Designing Competition Law Institutions, 25 WORLD CoMP. 25(3) 361, 361 (2002)
[hereinafter "DesigningCompetitionLaw Institutions"].
106. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 457; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supra note 104, at 361.
107. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 457; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supra note 104, at 363.
108. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 459; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supra note 104, at 368.
109. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 457; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supra note 104, at 364.
110. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 458; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supra note 104, at 365.
111. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 458; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supra note 104, at 366-67.
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contest the adverse party's position. 112 Lastly, the need for
predictability in the application of the law must be balanced with
flexibility as economic theory and the nature of industries evolve.1 1 3
Taken together, these sources demonstrate that there are three
general categories of techniques for implementing democracy in
administrative law. The first can be labeled checks and balances, as it
involves the checks that the other branches of government can place
on administrative agencies to ensure they comply with democratic
principles. This idea is exemplified in almost all the U.S. sources by
discussion of legislative, executive, and judicial controls over
administrative agencies, including the necessity of judicial review. The
next category can be labeled as public participation in the
administrative process, which includes techniques which many of the
sources discuss such as notice and comment. The last category is a
miscellaneous category that consists of some of the additional
approaches and suggestions, such as the internal controls that Levitan
suggests, the miscellaneous techniques suggested by Lorch, and the
discussion of the questions and values competition agencies consider
from Lacobucci and Trebilcock.
4. Bias, Discrimination,Due Process, Openness, and Public
Participation
Due process of law and procedural fairness are fundamental aspects
of democratic government. These two concepts may take on different
meanings depending on the specifics of the jurisdiction in question.
Nonetheless, several aspects of due process can be identified as
relevant to competition law by national competition agencies.
One important aspect is the absence of bias or discrimination in the
handling of a claim or defense. Similar cases should be treated the
same while different cases should be treated differently. The national
identity or political affiliation of the respondent should not determine
the investigation, bringing, or resolution of a competition claim.
Nondiscrimination has several meanings in this context. Borrowing
from the vocabulary of the WTO, unlawful discrimination can take two
different forms. WTO law bars one form of discrimination in its Most
Favored Nation (MFN) provisions. 1 1 4 MFN status means that a nation

112. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 458; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supranote 104, at 367.
113. Values, Structure, and Mandate, supra note 104, at 458; Designing Competition
Law Institutions, supranote 104, at 367.
114. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A5 (Supp.
A), 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
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(or its nationals) will not receive less favorable treatment than any
other nation or national in the WTO. 1 1 5
In competition terms, MFN provisions would bar discrimination in
the application of competition law based on nationality. For example,
a British company or individual should not be treated less favorably
than an Argentinian company or individual under the competition law
of another nation, or vice versa.
WATO law also bars a different form of discrimination referred to as
national treatment. Here, a country will not treat a foreign product or
producer less favorably than a domestic product or producer.1 1 6 In the
antitrust context, foreign producers cannot be the subject of
competition proceedings where domestic producers are not subject to
the legal treatment under equivalent circumstances.H7 National
treatment violations can include situations where the law or
enforcement decisions explicitly discriminate against foreign
producers.1 1 8 More often, seemingly facially neutral statutes,
regulations, and guidelines can be applied in subtle ways that
effectively only apply to the disadvantage of foreign parties.119
Democratic decision making also involves an open and transparent
system where the parties and the public can determine what is
occurring and participate as appropriate. In the United States, a
complaint to either of the federal competition agencies has no legal
significance. The agencies have complete discretion on how to proceed
with the information and when, or if, to take any further action. 120 No
agency response is required, and the complaining parties have no legal
standing to participate in any resulting investigation or any right to
challenge a decision not to proceed.
Similarly, the U.S. agencies have discretion on how to proceed if
they choose to conduct an investigation. They must initially decide
whether to open a preliminary investigation and whether to treat the
matter as a potential civil or criminal offense. 121 They eventually may
choose to bring a case in court or to close the investigation without

115. Id.
116. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 3, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A5 (Supp.
A), 55U.N.T.S. 188.
117. JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 273-303 (1969).

118. Id.
119.
law,

see

For discussion of WTO proceedings involving such claims related to competition
SPENCER WALLER

&

ANDRE

FIEBIG, ANTITRUST

AND AMERICAN

BUSINESS

ABROAD § 19.12 (4th ed. 2015).
120. See DEPT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, 111-6 (5th ed. Apr. 2018); I
STEPHANIE KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 24 (2019).
121. ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 119, at 111-7 to 111-12.

2019]

ANTITR UST AND DEMOCRACY

827

taking any action.122 There is no requirement that the agency explain
its decision to close a matter, although the agencies do so from time to
time in varying degrees of detail. 1 23 Outside parties cannot challenge a

decision not to proceed regardless of whether they were the
complaining party, provided information to the agency, or were
otherwise affected by the decision.
In contrast, a complaint to the European Commission is an act with
legal consequences. It triggers a legal duty to inquire into the matter
to a sufficient degree to determine whether a formal investigation is
warranted. 12 4 While the Commission has substantial discretion as to
how it allocates its budget and personnel, that discretion is not
unlimited. 125 It must explain its decision and a complainant or other
affected third party may participate and challenge the decision not to
proceed. 12 6 Here too, the Commission is accorded substantial deference
by the European Court of Justice, but must explain and defend its
action to decline to proceed further. 127
B.

The Role of the Executive Branch

As discussed above, all constitutional systems do, or should,
embody some forms of checks and balances. These checks and balances
are embedded in the United States Constitution with separate and
distinct executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 12 8 In
parliamentary democracies, the majority party, or coalition of parties,
in the legislature form the government and ministries under the
leadership of a prime minister with an independent judicial branch. 129
This government serves until removed by election or a vote of no
confidence.1 30 Other systems of government mix and match aspects of
these two models with both strong and weak presidents and judicial
branches with varying degrees of independence.1 31
122. Id. at 111-21.
123. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ANTITRUST DIVISION ON ITS DECISION TO CLOSE ITS INVESTIGATION OF XM SATELLITE RADIO
HOLDINGS
INC.'S
MERGER
WITH
SIRIUS
SATELLITE
RADIO
INC.
(2008),

https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/March/08_at_226.html
5JU4-GY44].

[https://perma.cc/

124.

COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 993-96 (Van Bael & Bellis eds.,

5th ed.
125.
126.
127.
E.C.R.
128.

2010).
Id. at 993.
Id. at 996-97.
Case C-413/06P, Bertelsmann AG v. Indep. Music Publishers & Labels Ass'n, 2008
1-4951, ¶ 69.
U.S. CONST. art. II-IV.

129.

130.
131.

GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM

1.4 (6th ed. 2003).

Id.
Mathew Soberg Shugart, Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed
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In the U.S. system, the President is the chief executive and
nominates cabinet secretaries and other top officials of the Executive
Branch, who must be confirmed by the Senate but serve at the
pleasure of the President. 132 This includes the Attorney General, the
head of the Justice Department, which includes the Antitrust
Division.1 33 The Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division
must also be confirmed by the Senate. 13 4
The President also nominates the heads of the various independent
agencies who also must be confirmed by the Senate.1 35 They serve fixed
terms set by Congress and may not be removed without good cause. 13 6
In the case of the FTC, which enforces both competition and consumer
protection law, there are five Commissioners, but no more than three
can be members of the President's political party.1 3 7
There is a tradition of substantial independence of the Justice
Department and its operating divisions, such as the Antitrust
Division. 13 8 While the President has the power to command the
Attorney General or the Antitrust Division to either bring or not
pursue an antitrust case, for sound reasons, it is rarely exercised. 13 9
Authority Patterns, 3 FRENCH POL. 323, 323-24 (2005).
132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
133.

DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

ASSISTANT

ATTORNEY

GENERAL,

https://www.justice.gov/atr/assistant-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/WX78-AX8X].
134. Id.; Sara Forden & Billy House, Trump Antitrust Chief Pick is Said to be Blocked
by
Warren,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
7,
2017,
9:17
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-07/trump-s-pick-for-antitrust-chief-issaid-to-be-blocked-by-warren
[https://perma.cc/6CMW-5D7U].
This
opposition was
withdrawn in late September 2017 and the nominee was confirmed to head the Antitrust
Division. Brent Kendall, Senate Confirmed Makan Delrahim as Antitrust Chief at Justice
Department; The 73-21 Senate Vote Followed a Delay that was Due in Part to Objections
Raised
by
Sen.
Elizabeth
Warren,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
27,
2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-confirms-makandelrahim-as-antitrust-chief-at-justicedepartment- 1506552099 [https://perma.cc/YN5R-U5A7].
135. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation
for FTC Commissioners).
136. Humphrey v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624-26 (1935).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
138. See Ryan J. Reilly, Trump Does Not Acknowledge or Respect DOJ's Independence.
That
Can't
End
Well.,
HUFFPOST
(updated
July
26,
2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trump-justicedepartmentn_5970cdfce4b0aal4ea783baf [https://perma.cc/M2MA-BF8N].
139. See WALLER & FIEBIG, supra note 118, § 2.16; GERARD HELFERICH, AN UNLIKELY
TRUST: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, J.P. MORGAN, AND THE IMPROBABLE PARTNERSHIP THAT

REMADE AMERICAN BUSINESS (2018); Carl W. Hittinger & Tyson Y. Herrold, Presidential
Power and Antitrust Politics: Part Two, BAKERHOSTETLER (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Litigation/2017/Articles/08-25-2017-The-LegalIntelligencer-Hittinger-Herrold.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LY9-YG55]; MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS,
TAKING CHARGE: THE JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE TAPES, 1963-1964, at 139-43, 151-53 (1997);
George Lardner, Jr., On Tape Nixon Outlines 1971 Deal' to Settle Antitrust Case Against
ITT,

THE

WASHINGTON

POST

(Jan.

4,

1997),
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The Justice Department and its constituent divisions are the legal
experts in complicated areas of the law in which the White House lacks
expertise. In addition, the Justice Department is a repeat litigant in
numerous areas of criminal and civil law before the federal courts and
must cultivate and preserve a reputation for careful case selection and
litigation, lest all of its litigation efforts be affected.
At the same time, the President and the Executive Branch have a
broader perspective and vision for the overall interests of the United
States. For example, it would be foolish to either proceed, or refrain,
from a particular antitrust enforcement if that decision were to
inevitably lead to an armed conflict or the destruction of diplomatic
relations with either a friendly or hostile nation. While the promotion
of competition and economic markets is a fundamental policy of the
United States and most other jurisdictions, it is normally only one of
many policy issues that must be balanced by nations in their day-today diplomacy interactions.
As a result, there have been times when the Executive Branch has
decided that antitrust enforcement must yield to a broader vision of
the national interest. For example, the Truman Administration in the
late 1940s directed that the antitrust investigation of the international
petroleum industry be limited in scope and proceed on a civil, rather
than a criminal, basis. 140 This decision was based on the political and
diplomatic repercussions of the case on broader United States
interests in the Middle East. 14 1
The massive antitrust litigation against AT&T resulting in the
divestiture of the Bell System spanned two different administrations
and involved high level policy decisions regarding the case from both
Presidents Ford and Reagan. President Ford supported the decision to
initiate the case in 1974 and President Reagan supported the
continuation of the case against "furious" lobbying from members of
his administration that the case would harm national defense
interests. 14 2
The Reagan Administration also quashed a criminal grand jury
investigation of the international aviation industry following the
demise of Laker Airlines. 143 The investigation affected United States'
relations with Great Britain, who was proceeding with the
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/01/04/on-tape-nixon-outlines-1971deal-to-settle-antitrust-case-against-itt/246628a9-8abf-47f3-80ec379569e0f350/?utm-term=.1009df95f5b7 [https://perma.cc/EXP7-LJGJ]; 15 U.S.C. § 16
(2012).
140. WALLER & FIEBIG, supra note 118, at § 2.16.
141. Id.
142. Hittinger & Herrold, supra note 138, at 1.
143. WALLER & FIEBIG, supra note 118, at § 5.11.
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privatization of British Airways. 1 4 4 Absent allegations of corruption or
other improper influences, it is hard to argue that such rare
interventions in the name of overall national interest violate
democratic norms.
A statute which gives the executive branch, or a ministry, the
explicit power to sacrifice competition for national security or some
other significant national interest is equally defensible in terms of
democratic values, regardless of the wisdom of any particular decision
under those powers. For example, numerous jurisdictions have public
interest standards in their merger laws allowing the approval or
rejection of transactions on grounds other than their competitive
effects. 145
While the United States does not have public interest standards in
its merger regime, it does have three statutes allowing noncompetition factors to supersede competitive analysis in order to
achieve national security objectives. First, mergers may be blocked on
national security grounds, even if cleared by the competition
agencies. 1 4 6 Second, the United States enacted Section 232 of the Trade
Act of 1962, which allows the Secretary of Commerce to conduct
investigations to determine the effect of imports on any article of the
national security of the United States. 147 Finally, the Defense
Production Act of 1950 (DPA) allows the President to exempt
agreements between private parties from the application of the
antitrust laws where such action was taken for the national defense. 1 4 8
Fortunately, these statutes are rarely used. Section 232 was
invoked by the Trump Administration for the first time in years and
the DPA has not been used for decades. 1 4 9 To rely on the frequent use
of these tools involves an explicit sacrifice of competition for the
promotion of other national values. However, a reasoned decision to do
so on the grounds that the overall gain to national security or defense
exceed the costs to economic competition may be unwise, but it is not
undemocratic.

144. Id.
145. E.g., Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in the Merger
Regulation Under the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH
AFRICA 8 (May 31, 2016), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/GovGazette-Public-Interest-Guidlines.pdf [https://perma.ccH7XY-DWUT].
146. 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2012).
147. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (2012).
148. 50 U.S.C. § 4558(j) (2012).
149. 2 JERRY COHEN, CHRISTOPHER A. DUNN, & MATTHEW MCCULLOUGH,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICE §42:1-2 (2018-19 ed.); JEFFREY L. KESSLER & SPENCER
WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 12:15 (2d ed. 2018).
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There have also been examples where the executive branch has
sought to intervene or influence individual enforcement actions for less
noble reasons. A new book analyzes the extent to which President
Theodore Roosevelt's friendship with J.P. Morgan may have
influenced the scope of his administration's antitrust actions against
the railroad industry dominated by Morgan's banking interests.5 0
President Kennedy initiated a criminal price fixing probe of the steel
industry to pressure U.S. Steel to renounce a planned price increase. 5
Taped conversations from the Johnson Administration reveal an
instance where the President overtly threatened a bank with denial of
its planned merger unless bank executives could persuade a local
newspaper to endorse President Johnson for reelection. 15 2 A lesserknown aspect of the Watergate crisis involved the use of illegal
campaign donations to influence a pending merger decision.1 53 This
led, in part, to the eventual passage of the Tunney Act requiring open
court hearings before the entry of a consent decree in government
antitrust cases. 15 4 It would be equally troubling if the antitrust laws
were to be used going forward at any level to punish political enemies
or silence dissent and criticism.
C.

The Legislature

While legislatures are the natural repository of lawmaking
authority in most democracies, the full role of a legislature in a
democracy is beyond the scope of this article. In general, a legislature
plays the same role in the competition law area that it plays in any
other area of the law. It enacts and amends laws relating to the
substance, procedure, institutions, remedies, exemptions, and
immunities of competition law.' Depending on the system, the
legislature also confirms political appointments to the agencies and
the judiciary, appropriates the budget for each agency, oversees
agency conduct, conducts investigations, holds hearings on legislation
and issues, enacts resolutions, and debates in committee and in the
full assembly.1 6 This work is done by the elected members and their
staff in plenary sessions as well as in committees.157 Often the personal
staff of the elected representatives or the committee staff have
150. HELFERICH, supranote 138.
151. Hittinger & Herrold, supra note 138, at 2.
152. BESCHLOSS, supranote 138, at 139-43, 151-53.
153. Lardner, supra note 138.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
155. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
156. Id.
157. Enactment of a Law, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/
common/briefing/Enactment_1aw.htm [https://perma.cc/N9KF-GA98].
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substantial area expertise. Occasionally, legislatures "outsource"
competition law matters to blue ribbon commissions or panels to
formulate policy recommendations. 1

8

The interest of the legislature in competition law matters will, of
necessity, wax and wane. While competition law is of importance in
the economic sphere, it is only one of a multitude of competing areas
of interest and importance to a jurisdiction's legislature, along with
the press of regularly scheduled business and unexpected
emergencies.
A legislature can give as much or as little time to competition law
and policy as it wishes. In the U.S. Congress, the Senate must devote
time to enacting legislation, confirming Presidential nominees, budget
appropriations, and conducting oversight hearings. '19 These activities
are important in their own right and in ensuring that the agencies
fulfill their role as expert, but democratic, institutions. The rest is
more or less optional and dependent on any individual Congress's level
of interest and the press of other business.
It is disappointing that the U.S. Congress has more often focused
on the minutiae of competition law and policy or conducted hearings
on high profile mergers that, by design, cannot affect the eventual
enforcement actions of the agencies. 16 0 There have been no major
amendments of the antitrust laws since the 1970s. 16 1 Criminal
penalties have been increased, but the private treble damage remedies
as a whole have been largely left unchanged. 1 62 Exemptions and
immunities have been expanded and contracted at the margins. 1 6 3
Budgets have been increased and lowered depending on the era and
the overall political zeitgeist.
Unfortunately, much of Congressional attention to competition law
has involved minor issues and outright petty matters. For example,
Congress effectively killed a proposal that would have rationalized
cooperation between the Antitrust Division and the FTC because it
158. See e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1 (April 2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amefinal-report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G78W-MN5K].
159. U.S. CONST. art. I & II.
160. First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2555-59.
161. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. II, 90 Stat.
1383 (codified as amendmennt to 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)) (requiring pre-merger notification of
certain large transactions); Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2012) (requiring judicial approval
of consent decrees in government antitrust cases).
162. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-237,
118 Stat. 665 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1) (allowing only single damages in private suits against
successful leniency applicants).
163. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 24, FEDERAL STATUTORY
EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW 291 (2007).
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affected which Congressional committee had "jurisdiction" over the
work of these agencies. 164 Even more petty was the unsuccessful effort
of one Congressman to force the FTC to vacate its headquarters for an
expansion of the national art museum.165
The opportunity costs for each hearing on such marginal issues, for
example, whether professional baseball should continue to enjoy a
partial exemption from the antitrust laws or grandstanding for
constituents over the fate of a particular merger with a pronounced
local effect, is high. Congress sacrifices time, money, and attention
better used to study more important, broader issues of competition law
and policy. Stated enforcement policy over unilateral conduct and
merger policy have changed substantially between administrations
and over time. Important guidelines and stated enforcement priorities
have changed as well with little substantive Congressional
involvement. 16 6 Critical decisions by the United States Supreme Court
have changed the law in dramatic and subtle ways without significant
Congressional input either before or after the decisions. 167
Perhaps Congress simply does not care about, or actually approves
of, the continued evolution of United States antitrust law and policy in
all its complexity. However, this silence or indifference has important
consequences. It shifts power from the most democratic elected
institutions to the more distant, less democratic institutions of
agencies and courts to craft fundamental economic policy free from all
but the most macro-level interventions or corrections.
No legislature can spend all of its time on competition policy. But
when it does, one should ask:
Is the legislature addressing fundamental issues or minor
matters at the fringe?
164. U.S.
FOR

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOJ AND FTC ANNOUNCE NEW CLEARANCE PROCEDURES
ANTITRUST
MATTERS
(Mar.
5,
2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/

atr/public/pressreleases/2002/10171.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SXC-7CMK].
165. Charles S. Clark, Mica Steps Up Bid to Evict FTC from Headquarters, NAT'L J.
(April 20,
2012),
https://www.yahoo.com/news/mica-steps-bid-evict-ftc-headquarters212733209.html [https://perma.cc/8GSL-F2MJ].
166. See, e.g., Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2010),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010
[https://perma.cc/
M44P-FEX3] (most recent in a string of such guidelines dating back to 1968); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
SHERMAN
ACT
(2008),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2009/05/11/236681.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MB3-88MJ] (report produced by the Bush Justice
Department, which was withdrawn by Obama Administration); Justice Department
Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May 11, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-report-antitrust-monopolylaw [https://perma.cc/4BNN-C94F] (official press release announcing the withdrawal of the
Obama Administration from the "Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act").
167. First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2559.
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Is the legislature addressing matters of national importance or
local concern of a small group of members?
Has the legislature proposed or explored actual improvements
or is it primarily airing issues for which no action is likely to ensue?
How is the legislature ensuring that power is delegated subject
to democratic controls and that the other institutional actors are
acting in accordance with democratic norms?
If major changes have occurred elsewhere in the system, had
Congress actually approved or merely not paid attention?
What non-mandatory hearings occur, how were they selected,
and why do they matter?
Without such inquiries, power naturally migrates from the more
democratic institutions to the less democratic portions of the system.
If legislatures approve of the course of current competition law and
policy, they should say so. If they do not approve, then their silence
should not be used to justify self-interested actors shifting power in
their favor, while the legislature chooses to turn its attention to other
pressing issues and only nibble at the edges of competition policy.
D.

The Judiciary

The role of the judiciary in democratic theory is a complicated one.
The federal judicial branch in the United States is designed to enjoy
substantial independence and not be politically accountable. Yet, it
must also declare what the law is, enforce that law in a fair and
nondiscriminatory manner, hold the government accountable to the
law, and resolve disputes between private parties.1 6 8
How the judiciary accomplishes all those tasks in the competition
law field begins with questions of institutional design. United States
federal judges are generalists handling a large docket of criminal
cases, civil matters involving constitutional, treaty, and statutory
matters, as well as disputes between citizens of different states
involving more than $75,000.169 Antitrust disputes are rare but
normally large in scope, difficult legally and factually, and time
consuming.1 7 0 United States federal trial judges must supervise
pretrial proceedings and any resulting trials for up to several hundred
168. Court Role and Structure, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/court-role-and-structure [https://perma.cc/F5PF-SR6M] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
This article does not discuss the role of the jury in ensuring the democratic application of
competition law since this is almost exclusively a U.S. issue outside the criminal context. For
more on this additional aspect of democracy in antitrust see First & Waller, Antitrust's
Democracy Deficit, supra note 35, at 2552-55.
169. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (2012).
170. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION 519 (4th ed. 2004).
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cases with a staff of two law clerks, an administrative assistant, and
the assistance of a single magistrate judge.17 1 Appeals of any
dispositive orders are handled by a three judge panel from the United
States Courts of Appeal with similar generalist backgrounds, docket
constraints, and resource limitations.1 7 2
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department brings all of its
cases in federal court before the United States District Court that has
jurisdiction over the defendants charged with a civil or criminal
antitrust violation.173 The U.S. FTC brings most of its merger cases
directly in federal district court in the same manner. 17 4 The FTC also
brings certain cases through an internal administrative procedure,
and the losing party can appeal to the appropriate appellate court. 17 5
In a second type of judicial system, similar to Chile's system,
competition law disputes are handled by specialist tribunals and
courts which can include both competition law experts and economists.
For example, in Chile the government brings its cases before a fiveperson expert tribunal that includes both expert competition lawyers
and economists. 17 6 The Tribunal also hears certain private claims for
damages.1 7 7 Decisions of the Tribunal are appealed to the Chilean
Supreme Court. 17 8
Regardless of the institutional design chosen, every judicial system
requires some form of due process and fundamental fairness at each
level of decision making. Court and tribunals are expected to provide
both sides of the dispute with impartial justice in accordance with the
substantive and procedural requirements of the legal provisions
governing the dispute. These requirements are clearer when a court
must litigate a claim from start to finish. In the United States,
criminal matters must be proven by the government beyond a
reasonable doubt and civil matters must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence by the plaintiff (whether public or private).1 7 9 The
171. Who Works in a United States Federal Court, FED. JUD. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2016),
https://www.fic.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Who%20Works%20in%20a%20U.S.%
20Court.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4MN-HA2D] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
172. About
the
U.S.
Courts of Appeals,
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure/about-us-courtsappeals [https://perma.cc/UNR3-C49J] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
173. ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 119, at IV-5 to IV-87.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (2012).
175. 16 C.F.R. § 3.52 (2018).
176. Chile Accession Report on Competition Law and Policy, OECD 30-31 (2010),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/47950954.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD5P-JF7W] (last visited Oct. 3,
2017).
177. Id. at 28, 32-33.
178. Id. at 30.
179. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern all civil cases regardless of
who is the plaintiff or what type of matter is litigated. 180 Whether a
party has received correct legal rulings, due process, and fundamental
fairness can be vigorously litigated before the trial judge, and resolved
on appeal through review of the record generated in the trial court.
The situation is trickier when an expert regulatory agency decides
a matter administratively and then that matter is appealed to the
courts. Virtually every legal system grapples with the issue of the
degree of deference that should be given to the decisions of expert
agencies that have been given the power by the legislature to issue
rules and adjudicate complicated questions of law and fact in deciding
whether the law has been broken.1 8 1 The question of appellate

deference to regulatory decisions is all the more important in the
competition law arena where the consequences are severe and in many
systems involve large fines deemed to be quasi-criminal in nature. 18 2
The United States Supreme Court has developed two different
theories of deference to administrative decision making. The Chevron
doctrine deals with situations where Congress has enacted an
ambiguous statute and explicitly or implicitly intended the agency to
fill in the gaps through authoritative interpretation. 183 Authoritative
interpretations most often take the form of notice and comment,
rulemaking, or formal adjudication. 18 4 Under such circumstances,
courts must defer to the agency's interpretation of the law, unless the
agency action was procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.1 8 5

Rationales for the Chevron doctrine include both separation of
powers and democratic accountability. 186 Judicial deference is
warranted in part because "policy judgments are not for the courts but
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
181. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
182. Maciej Bernatt, TransatlanticPerspectives on JudicialDeference in Administrative
Law, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 275 (2016) [hereinafter Bernatt, TransatlanticPerspectives].
183. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. See generally WERHAN, supranote 51, at 331-36.
184. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
185. Id.; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretationsfrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1086 (2008); see generally Dan Farber, Everything You Always Wanted to
Know About the Chevron Doctrine, YALE J. L. & REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 23, 2017),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/everything-you-always-wanted-to-know-about-the-chevron-doctrineby-dan-farber/ [https://perma.cc/6XJQ-AZ9B]; Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker,
Symposium, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475
(2014).
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
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for the political branches; Congress having left the policy question
open, it must be answered by the Executive." 187 Deference is also
warranted because administrative action via delegation by the
legislature enjoys a democratic mandate, unlike the courts.18 8
The United States Supreme Court also has recognized a less
compelling form of deference, referred to as Skidmore deference.189
Under Skidmore deference, an agency's determination may merit some
deference, whatever its form, given the specialized experience,
expertise, broader investigative authority, and broader information
available to the agency, the value of uniformity of what a national law
requires, and the persuasiveness of the agency determination, even if
informal in nature.19 0 Skidmore deference is usually accorded to some
degree to agency soft law, actions, and statements like policy guidance,
operating manuals, and enforcement guidelines. 91
Neither Chevron nor Skidmore deference formally apply to the
enforcement actions of the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department. 192 The Antitrust Division does not utilize rulemaking
procedures, nor does it hold administrative hearings. 193 1 nstead, it goes
to court when it charges individuals or enterprises with criminal or
civil antitrust violations.1 9 4 Once in court, the Antitrust Division must
prove a criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and has
the normal burden of proof of any civil litigant in proving the
defendant liable by a preponderance of the evidence.195
At the same time, the Antitrust Division (and the rest of the Justice
Department) is not just any litigant. Its many enforcement guidelines
(most jointly issued with the FTC, but others alone) are treated with
respect, if not precisely judicial deference in the sense of the Chevron
and Skidmore doctrines.19 6 The guidelines are frequently cited as
indicative of the state of antitrust doctrine and the courts have ruled
against the Division if it does not produce evidence supporting the
positions set forth in its enforcement guidelines. 197 In addition, the
187. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationof Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 515 (1989).
188. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 551 (1985).
189. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
190. Id.
191. Bernatt, TransatlanticPerspectives, supra note 181, at 286.
192. In the Matter of UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 444, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2006).
193. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4, 5 (2012).
194. ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 119, at IV-5 to IV-87.
195. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 309; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371-72 (Harlan, J., concurring).
196. Waller, Prosecutionby Regulation, supra note 50, at 1384.
197. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United
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Justice Department is frequently asked by the Supreme Court (and
occasionally lower courts) about whether to hear an antitrust claim
and how to decide antitrust claims in private antitrust litigation. 198
The Justice Department's submissions to the Supreme Court are
frequently persuasive regardless of whether they technically receive
"deference" in the Chevron or Skidmore sense. 99
The question of judicial deference to a FTC decision is a more
complicated matter. The FTC is an independent regulatory agency
established by Congress with powers over both consumer protection
and competition matters. 2 00 The FTC Act prohibits both unfair
methods of competition, and unfair and deceptive acts and practices. 2 0 1
The FTC also enforces a wide variety of other statutes that relate to
consumer protection and privacy. 202 The FTC engages in notice and
comment rulemaking in consumer protection, but not in competition
matters. 2 03

Unfair methods of competition include violations of the Sherman
and Clayton Act and a poorly defined penumbra of incipient violations
of these statutes and matters that violate the spirit, if not the letter,
of the antitrust laws. 2 0 4 When the FTC brings an enforcement action
directly in federal court, it is a litigant like any other public or private
plaintiff in civil litigation. The FTC wins its case when it correctly
interprets the law and proves the allegations in the complaint by a
preponderance of the evidence.
When the FTC brings an administrative action for a cease and
desist order, it follows a series of strict procedural requirements set
forth in the FTC Act. 2 0 5 At the completion of the staff investigation,
agency staff must seek an affirmative majority vote of the full
Commission to issue an administrative complaint. 2 06 Any subsequent

States v. Baker Hughes 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
198. See, e.g., Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Heibei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 137 S.Ct. 2320,
2320 (2017) (inviting Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United
States).
199. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Heibei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 138 S.Ct. 1865, 1865
n.6 (2018).
200. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45 (2012).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
202. See generally I STEPHANIE KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 6, 19-20 (2019).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (2012).
204. Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 235 (1972);
Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding "Unfair Methods of Competition" Under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public-statements/735201/150813section5enfor
cement.pdf [https://perma.cc/A963-Y9UF].
205. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012).
206. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 160-61
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proceeding takes the form of a trial in front of an independent
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the defendant represented by
counsel. 2 07 The Commissioners do not participate in the trial before the
ALJ. 2 08 The Commissioners hear any appeal from the decision of the
ALJ and conduct briefing and hearing before voting and issuing the
official decision of the FTC. 2 0 9 A losing respondent (but not the FTC
staff) may then appeal the matter to the relevant federal appellate
court.

2 10

An unfortunate dichotomy exists when the FTC brings an
administrative action for a cease and desist order and the losing
respondent appeals to the federal appellate courts. In consumer
protection matters the FTC receives the normal judicial deference
under the Chevron doctrine as do most other federal agencies in formal
adjudication matters. 2 1 1 This means that the FTC's construction of its
own statute is upheld unless the court finds that the statute is
unambiguous or find that the agency interpretation is unreasonable. 2 12
This is not the case in competition matters. The courts do not accord
Chevron deference to the FTC's interpretation of the meaning of unfair
methods of competition in antitrust cases, stating that the meaning of
the antitrust laws is a matter for the courts to decide de novo. 2 13
At the same time, the courts often have upheld the factual findings
of the FTC when supported by "substantial evidence." 2 14 A recent
appellate court decision defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."21 5 This includes complicated matters that touch on
questions of fact, economics, and the application of law to facts such as
market definition, market power, and harm to competition. 2 16 The
substantial evidence test does not require excluding all other possible
explanations for the conduct in question, and an FTC decision may be
(2007).
207. Id. at 161.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. I STEPHANIE KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 9.6 (2015).
212. Id.
213. Bernatt, TransatlanticPerspectives, supra note 181, at 315-18 (surveying cases).
See generally Royce Zeisler, Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why the FTC Should
Use Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 266 (2014); Justin
(Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of AdministrativeAntitrust, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 209,
212 (2014).
214. Bernatt, TransatlanticPerspectives, supra note 181, at 318-20.
215. McWane, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 783 F.3d 814, 824 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Schering-Plough v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005)).
216. Id. at 824-25.
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upheld as supported by substantial evidence even if there was
evidence in the record that could support some other conclusion. 2 17
In the European Union, the question of judicial deference is
controversial for a different reason. The European Commission is a
unitary agency handling investigations, adjudications, exemptions,
settlements, fines, and remedies. 2 18 It lacks the strict separation of
powers and functions of the FTC.21 9 As a result, many critics have
argued that judicial deference to the legal, factual, and complex
economic findings of the Commission are inappropriate under the EU
Treaties, due process, and human rights concerns. 2 2 0
Critics argue that full judicial review is required in competition
matters imposing a fine by Article Six of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). 2 2 1 Such fines are deemed criminal in nature
even when imposed by an administrative body such as the European
Commission. 2 2 2 Article Six of the ECHR states that, in the
determination of civil rights, and obligations or in any criminal
matters, "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal." 2 23
The European General Court and the European Court of Justice
have not yet accepted these arguments. To the contrary, the EU courts
accord a degree of de facto deference to the complex economic findings
of the European Commission, its factual findings, its calculation of
fines, and its interpretation of its own soft law. 2 2 4 One EU scholar

217. Id.; Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.y. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 534 F.3d 410, 437 (5th Cir.
2008); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000); Hosp. Corp.
of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1385 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally Maciej
Bernatt, McWane and Judicial Review of Federal Trade Commission Decisions Any
Inspirationsfor EU CompetitionLaw?, 38 EUR. CoMP. L. REV. 288 (2017).
218. Council Regulation 1/2003 of Dec. 16, 2002, Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (referring to 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1).
219. Bernatt, TransalanticPerspectives, supra note 181, at 315.
220. See generally Maciej Bernatt, The Compatibility of DeferentialStandardof Judicial
Review in the EU Competition Proceedings with Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights 12 (Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for Antitrust and
Consumer
Studies
Working
Paper,
2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2447884
[https://perma.cc/49VE-EYNS]
(discussing
the
counterarguments against the deferential standard of review).
221. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
222. Case T-1/89, Rhone-Poulenc v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-867, 884-85.
223. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
224. See Bernatt, Mc Wane and JudicialReview of Federal Trade CommissionDecisions,
supra note 216, at 6, 8.
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recently has argued that this degree of deference roughly corresponds
with the substantial evidence test used in the United States. 2 25
The bottom line is the degree of judicial deference in most systems
appears to be inversely related to the degree of due process and
separation of functions at the administrative level. Arguably, both the
United States and European Union systems err in giving too little and
too much deference, respectively, to the administrative competition
decisions of its expert agencies.
E. State Attorneys General and Sub-Federal Competition Agencies
Many competition systems have more than one level of
enforcement. In such systems, this raises issues of allocation of
responsibilities and jurisdiction between the federal and sub-federal
enforcers. The most thorough devolution of power appears to the
Russian Federation which has both a Federal Anti-Monopoly Service
and numerous regional offices across the Federation. 2 2 6 These regional
offices are largely autonomous from the national competition
authority, and have the autonomy to investigate, adjudicate, and
appeal matters separately from the national authority. 227 At the
opposite end of the spectrum lie national competition authorities that
may establish regional offices purely for administrative convenience,
and those employees take their direction from the national
headquarters. In the United States, both the Antitrust Division and
the FTC have such regional offices. 2 2 8
The EU is an example of a competition law system where the
allocation of authority and jurisdiction is both more nuanced and
subject to a sophisticated network of responsibilities. After the
modernization of EU competition law, national competition
authorities and the national courts enforce both EU and national
competition law. 2 2 9 Relationships between national competition
authorities (NCAs) within the EU, and between NCAs and the
225.

Bernatt, TransatlanticPerspectives, supra note 181, at 292-93.

226.

About the FAS Russia, FED. ANTIMONOPOLY

SERV. OF THE RUSSIAN FED'N,

http://en.fas.gov.ru/about/what-we-do/general-information.html
[https://perma.cc/QBF66DH6] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
227. Id.
228. ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 119, at I-8. For example, the FTC has a
regional office in Chicago which currently handles only consumer protection matters,
although in the past the office handled both competition and consumer protection. Id.; FED.
TRADE COMM'N, REGIONAL OFFICES, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/regionaloffices [https://perma.cc/9GYS-7XBN] (last visited May 13, 2019). The Chicago field office
decisions are subject to review and approval by the FTC in Washington, D.C., except to the
extent that the FTC chooses to delegate discretion to the regional director of the office.
ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 119, at I-8.
229. Council Regulation, 1/2003, supra note 217, at Art. 3, 5-6.
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European Commission, are governed by the provisions of the European
Competition Network (ECN).23 0 The ECN allocates responsibilities
between and among the EU and the NCAs and has additional
provisions governing cooperation and information sharing. 231
Similarly, the EU Merger Regulation has provisions allocating
jurisdiction of certain mergers between and among the European
Commission and the NCAs.232
The United States also faces this issue. Each of the fifty states, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories have authority to enforce
their own state or local level competition provisions. 233 Since the 1970s,
state attorneys general 23 4 have had the authority to enforce the federal
antitrust laws in federal court on behalf of their natural citizens. 235 The
U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that state enforcers can proceed
in addition to, or instead of, the federal competition agencies. 2 3 6
There are no hard or soft law instruments that determine
jurisdiction, responsibilities, or cooperation in proceeding with cases
that attract the interest of more than one level of enforcement. The
states themselves cooperate through the National Association of
Attorneys General and often bring cases as a coalition of states that
share costs and responsibilities on a case-by-case basis. 23 7 There are
also circumstances when the states and one of the federal agencies act
together in litigating significant competition matters. 2 38
Despite the long-standing statutory authority of state attorneys
general to enforce both federal and state antitrust law, there has been
230. Overview, EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/een/
index en.html [https://perma.cc/X738-R9J6] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
231. Id.
232. Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of Jan. 20, 2004 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L24) 1, Arts.
1, 9, 19, 22.
233. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE OFF. OF THE ATT'Y GEN., Antitrust Enforcement,
https://ag.ny.gov/antitrust/antitrust-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/B6SH-5PZK]
(last
visited Aug. 13, 2019).
234. The District of Columbia and the U.S. overseas territories also have local
competition authorities. See, e.g., PL Price-Fixing,Bid-Rigging and Other Antitrust Issues,
OFF. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. FOR THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA, https://oag.dc.gov/pl-price-fixing-bidrigging-and-other-antitrust [https://perma.cc/P345-A24G].
235. 15 U.S.C § 15(c) (2012).
236. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 280 (1990).
237. NAT'L
AsS'N
OF
ATT'YS
GEN.,
Multistate
Task
Force,
http://www.naag.org/naag/committees/naag-standing--committees/antitrustcommittee/multistatetaskjforce.php [https://perma.cc/NTL9-JJGL] (last visited Aug. 13,
2019).
238. E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See generally
ANDREW I. GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014); WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT
CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007).
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significant criticism of state antitrust enforcement and calls to strip
states of this authority. 23 9 Much of this criticism focuses on the fact
that virtually all of the state attorneys general are elected officials. 240
Despite the obvious democratic accountability of such an arrangement,
the critics argue that elected state attorneys general have
inappropriate incentives to bring cases that should be left to the
federal level enforcers, and that they are subject to capture by local
political interests that influence case selection toward more overtly
political criteria or even anticompetitive outcomes. 241 Some have gone
as far to question the professional competence of state enforcers. 242
There is little empirical evidence to support either the capture or

competence critique.243
The fact that state attorneys general are popularly elected also
creates virtuous incentives to bring enforcement actions which directly
benefit state residents and which the general electorate might
approve. 24 4 The record shows that state attorneys general have often
used their powers under the antitrust laws to obtain monetary
compensation on behalf of state consumers and state governmental
entities injured by antitrust violations. 245 This is a role not normally
played by the Justice Department or the FTC in competition cases. 246
The states also continue to take a firmer stance against vertical
resale price fixing out of a concern for consumers who believe they will
benefit from price competition among independent sellers of the same
goods and services. For example, much of the limited case law
interpreting the rule of reason standard for retail price maintenance

239.

See e.g., Richard A. Posner, Federalismand the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by

State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 252 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2004); ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 185 (2007).

240. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys
General, supranote 238, at 256-57.
241. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940-41
(2001).
242. Id.
243. Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement,
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004, 1029-31 (2001).
244. First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2563.
245. Id. at 1018 tbl. 5; see also Harry First, Modernizing State Antitrust Enforcement:
Making the Best of a Good Situation, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 281, 300-01 (2009) (summarizing
cases).
246. The Antitrust Division and the FTC have only occasionally sought restitution in
antitrust cases. Waller & Fiebig, supra note 118, at § 6.9.
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(RPM) under the Leegin decision247 has come from the states. 2 4 8 In
contrast, none has come from the federal agencies. 2 4 9
While all enforcers have to be on their guard that enforcement
efforts do not end up protecting competitors from competition, the
states have shown that direct political accountability can also produce
incentives counterbalancing these protectionist forces and aligning
enforcement more directly with the will of the people. States thus have
produced a democratic and professional system that benefits the needs
of actual consumers and not merely theoretical consumer welfare.
F PrivateRights of Action and Collective Actions
Private rights of action are an additional avenue to maintain
democracy in competition law. Private rights of action allow private
parties to bring claims to a court or tribunal when they have been
wronged, regardless of whether the government chooses to take up
their claim in a public enforcement proceeding. It also permits private
parties to obtain compensation even if the government has pursued its
case in the name of punishment and/or deterrence. Private rights of
action allow private parties to persuade courts and tribunals of the
validity of causes of action, theories of liability, defenses, and
immunities that the government may not favor at any particular
moment. This brings about a certain stability to the system with
multiple parties seeking to pursue their self-interest free from political
coercion before a judiciary or tribunal charged with impartially
applying the law. Finally, creating private rights of action pushes the
power to pursue claims down to the level of those most directly affected
by the alleged unlawful conduct, a notion consistent with both
principles of justice, democracy, and subsidiarity. 25 0
The trend is toward the increase of private rights of action outside
the United States where, for a variety of reasons, private litigation has
always far outweighed the number of public enforcement actions. 2 5 1
The European Union has enacted its private damages directive, 2 52 and

247. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
248. See Michael A. Lindsay, Overview of State RPM, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE (April
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-source/lindsay
chart.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWW4-LS57].
249. First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2563.
250. Id. at 2554-55.
251. See generally Waller & Fiebig, supra note 118, at §§ 20.1-20.13.
252. Directive 2014/104, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Nov. 26, 2014
on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of
the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 2014 O.J.
(L 349) 1, 19 (EU).
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the member states have now completed the process of enacting the
directive into national legislation.2 53
These changes have promoted
democracy, principles of
subsidiarity, and helped address the allegations of democracy deficit
in the operation of the EU. 25 4 Enforcement powers have been pushed
from Brussels to the member states, and down to the citizens and
enterprises themselves. 25 5 There is no longer a need for private persons
and enterprises to wait for the government to accept and act on a
complaint. European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions about the direct
applicability of EU competition law have been made more concrete. 25 6
There are, however, limitations as to the bringing of private claims.
Absent pro bono type public interest litigation and purely personal
grudges, plaintiffs rarely bring claims in antitrust (or most other
fields) unless the expected value of the litigation is positive. 25 7 The
probability of winning and scope of anticipated damages (or monetary
value of the injunction) must exceed the costs of litigation and the
prospect of an award of fees and costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff
in most systems. 25 8 Without a positive value claim, most plaintiffs will
be unwilling or unable to proceed with their case or able to find counsel
willing to handle the matter on a contingent fee or a third party willing
to finance the litigation. 25 9 Jurisdictions seeking to permit or
encourage private damage claims must carefully analyze the mix of
incentives and disincentives to ensure that valid claims are brought
and frivolous claims deterred. In a world that largely rejects multiple
damages and insists on a loser pays principle, much can still be done
through the construction of rules, procedures, institutions, and
remedies to ensure that meritorious claims can be pursued by those
most affected by the conduct.
If either direct purchasers (or indirect purchasers where allowed)
have small claims, private damage claims will almost never happen
for the reasons set forth above. 2 60 There are numerous cartels and
253. Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions: Transpositionof the Directive in Member
States, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/
directive en.html [https://perma.cc/9DR8-C5XA] (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
254. First & Waller, Antitrust's Democracy Deficit, supra note 34, at 2566-67.
255. Id.
256. See Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan 2001 E.C.R. 1-6297, 1-6322-23.
257. J. Douglas Richards, Michael B. Eisenkraft, & Abigail E. Shafroth, Class Action, in
Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States, in PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 108, 109 (Albert A. Foer & Randy M. Stutz, eds.,
2012).
258. Id.
259. K. Craig Wildfang & Stacy P. Slaughter, Funding Litigation, in THE
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 257 (Albert A.
Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo eds., 2010).
260. Richards et al., supra note 256, at 109.
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other serious antitrust violations that involve a small overcharges or
other injury to a wide number of victims. For example, a cartel raising
the price of gel pens by ten or twenty percent will only involve a harm
of well less than a euro per pen. A successful cartel involving
intermediate chemicals used to soften rubber products used in
consumer goods such as rubber soled shoes, garden hoses, and tires
may only involve a penny or two per item. Only a zealot would pursue
such a negative value claim, even if they or their undertaking
purchased hundreds of the items.
To provide a viable claim for any or all of the victims of such illegal
conduct, some mechanism must be created to aggregate the numerous
negative value claims into a single positive value claim. Otherwise, the
formal availability of private rights of action will never be utilized by
a large and critical mass of plaintiffs with meritorious, but
individually low value claims. An increasing number of jurisdictions
have implemented class actions or collective actions to address these
problems. 261 For example, the EU instead offered a recommendation to
the member states regarding collective action, with some member
states creating their own collective actions even prior to the
recommendation. 2 6 2
Like private damage actions, there are numerous ways to
structure a collective action system for competition claims. In addition
to general issues about the substance and procedure of competition law
itself, any jurisdiction pursuing this path must answer such questions
as:
1) Standing: Whether only public officials, certain organizations,
and/or ad hoc groups of individuals will be permitted to bring
collective actions[?]
2) Scope: Will collective actions be available for all causes of
action or only selected types of litigation, such as consumer or
competition matters?
3) Remedies: Will successful collective actions result in damages,
injunctions, declaratory relief, or some combination?
4) Procedure: Can collective actions be used for settlement
purposes only or for litigation of contested claims?
5) Binding Effect: Will collective actions be opt-in or opt-out?

261. Waller & Fiebig, supra note 118, at §§ 20.6-20.13.
262. Commission Recommendation 2013/396 of June 11, 2013 on common principles for
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States
concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law, 2013 O. (L 201) 60, 60-62,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2013_3539_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK8R-UP7M].
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6) Financing: Will contingency fees, success bonuses, and/or third
party financing be allowed? Will one way or two-way loser pay
principles apply? 2 63
Reasonable people can differ on these questions. Each system will
have to work out whether the certification of the collective/class action
will involve the deep scrutiny and mini-trials of the merits that has
evolved in the United States in recent years, or the more relaxed
approach of resolving the issues at trial on a class wide basis that
Canada and other countries have favored. 2 64 As in any private damage
action, issues of contingency fees, indirect purchaser standing, damage
calculations, litigation finance, discovery, effect of prior government
verdicts, access to the government file, admissibility of leniency
applications, all have to be resolved. 265
Both common law and civil law jurisdictions have experimented
with different permutations of the class action and the collective
action. 266 Most have sought to distance themselves from the system
that has developed in the United States. 2 67 Ironically, class actions in
the United States are increasingly restricted through judicial and
statutory means at the very same time that the rest of the world is
seeking to increase mechanisms for collective actions in order to
address perceived gaps in deterrence and compensation. 26 8
One issue looms above all others. No collective action system for
competition claims has thrived without an opt-out mechanism. 26 9 Optin class actions for competition (and most other claims) do not work in
theory or in practice. 27 0 At a conceptual level, opt-ins are not true
collective actions, they are merely a form of joinder. 27 1 The need for a
conscious decision of a large group of plaintiffs affirmatively to opt into
a costly and risky proceeding are doomed to fail because of risk
aversion and the natural bias toward the status quo. 27 2 While there are
partial substitute mechanisms for large direct purchaser antitrust

263.

Spencer Weber Waller & Olivia Popal, The Fall and Rise of the Antitrust Class

Action, 39 WORLD CoMP. L. & ECON. REV. 29, 37 (2016); RACHEL MULHERON, THE CLASS
ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 23 (2006); Deborah

R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307 tbl. 2 (2011).
264. Waller & Popal, supra note 262, at 47-49.
265. Id. at 37.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Waller & Popal, supra note 262, at 49-50.
270. Id. at 50-51.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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claims, entities with small monetary claims simply have no rational
reason to bring valid claims or join the litigation brought by others. 27 3
As I have written with a co-author elsewhere: "Without some sort of
opt-out mechanism with as many procedural or judicial safeguards [for
the rights of defendant] as desired, proceeding with collective actions
is a cruel hoax and an expensive but ultimately fruitless enterprise." 27 4
Opt-out provisions may not be possible in every jurisdiction. Such
provisions may be inconsistent with a jurisdiction's history or legal
system. So be it. However, under such systems the choice in most
situations is not between collective actions and individual private
damage actions. It is between finding a way to create an effective
collective litigation system or a system with little or no private damage
claims.

27 5

G.

Civil Society

The role of an engaged civil society is critical for a competition
policy that is democratic. Awareness of competition policy through the
press, academia, along with a transparent agency and court system
helps make competition policy (and government more generally) more
accountable and directly engaged with the public at large. It allows
occasional competition issues to enter the realm of politics, but more
likely it helps create a culture of competition by making competition
policy more a reality for the everyday lives of consumers.
One aspect of an engaged civil society is the presence of public policy
institutions that regularly engage on competition policy matters. In
the United States there are a number of institutions that take on this
role from different ideological perspectives. Probably the largest entity
specializing in competition law and policy is the Antitrust Section of
the American Bar Association (ABA).2 7 6 The ABA Antitrust Section
covers both U.S. and comparative antitrust law as well as consumer
protection matters. 27 7 Its annual spring meeting attracts in excess of

273. For an example of an unsuccessful opt-in proceeding involving price-fixed UK soccer
jerseys see Waller & Popal, supra note 262, at 42. Even opt-out class actions face many
hurdles. For an example of recent unsuccessful requests for opt-out collective actions under
UK law see Gibson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Ltd. [2017] CAT 9 (Eng.); Merricks CBE v.
MasterCard, Inc. [2017] CAT 16 (Eng.).
274. Waller & Popal, supra note 262, at 51.
275. Spencer Weber Waller, The United States Experience With Competition ClassAction
Certification:A Comment, in LITIGATING CONSPIRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION CLASS
ACTIONS 209, 216 (Stephen G.A. Pitel ed., 2006).
276. Section
of
Antitrust
Law,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrustlaw.html [https://perma.cc/KJ67-PM7M].
277. Id.
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three thousand attorneys and other professionals for three days of
continuous programming and related events. 27 8
The spring meeting is a part of a full year of programming around
the United States and the globe, covering a variety of professional and
academic topics in the field. 27 9 In addition, the ABA Antitrust Section
is probably the largest publisher of antitrust law materials in the
world. 2 80 Its portfolio includes treatises, monographs, handbooks,
guides for the business community, the well-respected Antitrust Law
Journal, and other periodicals and newsletters. 2 8 1 The Section also
comments on pending legislation and guidelines in the United States
and abroad. 2 8 2 The ABA Antitrust Division is also just one of numerous
national, state, and local bar associations which have active
committees or sections in the antitrust field. 2 83
Think tanks and research institutions also address competition law
and policy matters from a variety of perspectives. Over the years,
virtually every Washington D.C. and national research institution,
regardless of its political leanings, has weighed in on one or more
significant matters in the antitrust field. This includes more
conservative and libertarian groups such as the Heritage
Foundation, 2 8 4 the Hoover Institute, 2 85 the Cato Institute, 2 86 and the

&

278. ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting to feature top officials from DOJ, FTC, Europe,
Australia, Mexico, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/news/
abanews/aba-news-archives/20 19/03/aba-antitrust-spring-meeting-to-feature-top-officialsfrom-doj--/ [https://perma.cc/7XD4-DQLB].
279. Section of Antitrust Law Section Events & CLE, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
https://www. americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2019/03/aba-antitrustspring-meeting-to-feature-top-officials-from-doj --/ [https://perma.cc/X7UG-QWHD].
280. See Section of Antitrust Law: Section Publications, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrustlaw/publications.html
[https://perma.cc/W4QB-8P76].
281. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, SECTION PUBLICATONS,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrustlaw/publications/
[https://perma.cc/89MHUB6C].
282. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMMENTS, REPORTS
AMICUS
BRIEFS,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrustlaw/resources/
comments reports-amicus briefs/ [https://perma.cc/RG6V-6HFH].
283. E.g.,
Antitrust
Law
Section,
STATE
BAR
OF
GEORGIA,
https://www. gabar.org/committeesprogramssections/sections/antitrust/index.cfm
[https://perma.cc/JZ9T-LHPT].
284. Alden Abbot, HeritageAntitrust Conference HighlightsDomestic and International
Policy Challenges for the next Administration, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.heritage.org/economic-and-property-rights/commentary/heritage-antitrustconference-highlights-domestic-and [https://perma.cc/WWL8-ZFBV].
285. Hoover IP2 partners with GCR to present conference on IP and Antitrust, HOOVER
INSTITUTE (May 19, 2017), http://hooverip2.org/news/hoover-ipC2%B2-partners-with-gcrto-present-conference-on-ip-and-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/DT2W-ADWU].
286. Alan Reynolds, Antitrust for Fun and Profit: The Democrats'Better Deal (Part1),
THE CATO INSTITUTE (August 17, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/antitrust-fun-profit-
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American Enterprise Institute,2 87 more centrist groups such as the
Brookings Institute, 2 88 and more enforcement oriented groups such as
the Center for American Progress 2 8 9 and the New American
Foundation. 2 90

&

There are also a number of research and advocacy organizations
that focus on competition matters. For example, the American
Antitrust Institute has for more than twenty years engaged in
lobbying, amicus briefs, research, conferences, and publication to
promote the vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws and a broader
vision of the role of antitrust law in U.S. society. 291 The Open Markets
Institute is a more recent group whose mission statement states that
the group utilizes "journalism to promote greater awareness of the
political and economic dangers of monopolization." 2 9 2 The Institute for
Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University Chicago School of
Law promotes a more consumer friendly competitive economy through
education, training, conferences, round table discussions, and the
presentation of its views to federal and state legislatures, enforcement
agencies, and international bodies concerned with competition law. 2 93
On the more libertarian perspective, organizations such as the
Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at
Northwestern University Law School has presented numerous
conferences and workshops on the application of law and economics to
various aspects of competition law and regulation. 2 94 The Law
Economics Center at George Mason University School has devoted
significant resources to law and economic trainings for law professors,
judges, and enforcement officials in the United States and abroad, and
democrats-better-deal-part-1 [https://perma.cc/6TCD-28DA].
287. Jeffrey Eisenbach, Antitrust Policy for a New Administration, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE (January 26, 2016), http://www. aei.org/publication/antitrust-policy-for-a-newadministration/ [https://perma.cc/SSY4-V3U4].
288. Tim Boersma, Can the EU turn Gazprom into Google?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (April
23, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/04/23/can-the-eu-turngazprom-into-google/ [https://perma.cc/Q8NU-YRQM].
289. Showing Results 1-10 out of 150 for "antitrust,"CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
https://www.americanprogress.org/search/?query=antitrust [https://perma.cc/UHZ3-TJYV].
290. Search: Antitrust, NEW AMERICAN FOUNDATION, https://www.newamerica.org/
search/?query=antitrust [https://perma.cc/2BUV-59RY].
291.

Mission

and

History,

AMERICAN

ANTITRUST

INSTITUTE,

https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/U2RE-JFFX].
292. Press Releases, OPEN MARKETS INSTITUTE, https://openmarketsinstitute.org/
[https://perma.cc/H7GU-8EDQ].
293. Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.luc.edu/antitrust [https://perma.cc/56LC-7P79].
294. Center on Law, Business, and Economics, NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF
LAW CENTER ON LAW, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/
[https://perma.cc/BN54-B7BP].
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advocates for a more libertarian approach to competition law. 2 95
Harder to pin down ideologically is the Stigler Center at the University
of Chicago Booth School of Business that has undertaken a fascinating
series of conferences on the perils of concentration and similar
concerns over power in the digital economy, all seemingly at odds with
the traditions of the "Chicago School" developed at that institution in
prior decades.

29 6

Trade associations and related professional groups also are actively
involved in the formulation and evaluation of competition matters. It
is a rare (or very small) trade association that does not have at least
one competition law attorney or other specialist on its staff or on
retainer. Among the larger trade organizations, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce devotes significant resources to competition law matters
and engages in lobbying, litigation, the filing of amicus briefs,
conferences, research, and publication on its views on competition
law. 297
Another important aspect of an engaged civil society is the presence
of a robust academic sector that teaches and studies competition law,
economics, and policy. In the United States, the directory of the
Association of American Law Schools lists approximately 200
accredited law schools with more than 260 professors who teach, or
have taught in the past, antitrust law as full-time faculty members. 2 98
This is in addition to numerous part-time adjunct members who teach
antitrust courses in addition to their full-time jobs as practicing
attorneys, judges, economists, or enforcers. U.S. law schools also offer
masters level programs in antitrust and trade regulation both on
295. Law & Economics Center, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY ANTONIN SCALIA SCHOOL OF
LAW, http://masonlec.org/ [https://perma.cc/L32M-B8LQ].
296. Academic Conferences, STIGLER CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECONOMY AND THE
STATE,
CHICAGO
BOOTH,
https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/academicconferences [https://perma.cc/MH9K-4AUN]. This conference was widely covered in the
business press. See, e.g., The University of Chicago worries about a lack of competition, THE
ECONOMIST:
THE
SCHUMPETER
BLOG
(Apr.
12
2017),
https://www. economist.com/news/business/2 1720657-its-economists-used-champion-bigfirms-mood-has-shifted-university-chicago
[https://perma.cc/MS3S-EE5D].
Despite its
reputation as a bastion of conservatism, the University of Chicago has included a number of
scholars concerned with the democratic and political values embedded in economic
competition. See, e.g., James W. Brock, Economic Power, Henry Simons, and a Lost Antitrust
Vision of Economic Conservatism, 58 S.D. L. REV. 443, 461 (2013) (discussing University of
Chicago scholar Henry Simon's view that private economic power was a threat to a
democratic society).
297. Antitrust
Council,
UNITED
STATES
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE,
https://www.uschamber.com/antitrust-council-0 [https://perma.cc/93SF-2SBQ]. See, e.g.,
Center,
https://www.chamberlitigation.com/
Chamber
Litigation
U.S.
[https://perma.cc/R35S-V6LY].
298. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
2016-17, at 1390-92.
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campus, and on line, for students who are currently working in field,
hope to work in the field, and who plan to seek academic careers in
this area.2 99 These subjects also are taught in varying degrees in
business schools, economics departments, and public policy schools at
both the graduate and undergraduate levels. There are numerous
antitrust conferences held throughout the year exploring practice,
policy, and theory issues. The result is a robust debate about the
values, techniques, and results of competition law and policy that
continues no matter which party is in office or who runs the
enforcement agencies.
The government agencies also play a role in creating an engaged
civil society in addition to operating in a transparent manner as
discussed above. The agencies post a tremendous amount of material
on their respective web sites, frequently speak to legal and business
groups, publish guidelines for both professional and lay audiences,
hold press conferences on high visibility cases, and other enforcement
actions. The agencies also testify in front of Congress, hold workshops,
post on social media, respond to freedom of information act requests,
and maintain libraries and databases for the public.3 00
Equally important, the agencies receive input from the public as
well as send information out to the public. The Agencies receive
complaints and white papers from interested parties and the public.3 01
They obtain testimony and comments from the public in workshops,
review responses to draft guidelines, and communicate on an informal
basis with members of the competition community on a daily basis. 3 0 2
The ways an agency receives input from the public are limited only
by its imagination. The Competition and Consumer Commission of
Singapore used to hold a contest for the best animated short
submission on the evils of cartels.3 03 Other agencies have come up
equally creative ways to receive feedback and input from the public, in
addition to the material they make available to the public.3 04
299. E.g., Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
https://www.luc.edu/law/academics/centersinstitutesandprograms/
instituteforconsumerantitruststudies/ [https://perma.cc/PG7P-AWL3].

300. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., Public Documents (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/public-documents [https://perma.cc/3FKA-MZ3Y].
301. ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 119, at 111-6.
302. E.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., Public Documents, supranote 299.
303. Competition Commission of Singapore (CCS) Animation Competition 2013,
TEMASEK
POLYTECHNIC:
SCH.
OF
ENG'G
(June
11,
2013),
https://www.tp.edu.sg/schools/eng/showcase/achievements/animationcompetition2013
[https://perma.cc/WEG7-F4JA].
304. Competition Law and How it Affects Businesses, UK COMPETITION & MARKETS
AUTHORITY (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/video-guides-onillegal-anti-competitive-activities [https://perma.cc/FDF9-HWD9] (short animated videos).
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The general and business press plays an equally important role in
reporting on competition matters. Major publications such as the Wall
Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, The Economist,
and many business magazines regularly feature stories about criminal
cartel cases and investigations, issues involving allegedly dominant
firms, the flood of mergers and acquisitions in the United States and
abroad, and major private damage cases.3 05 More analytical stories
appear on such topics as the role of big data in antitrust, algorithmic
competition, and the pros and cons of the EU's enforcement actions
against Google and pending investigations of other high-tech firms.3 06
Social media increasingly is both supplementing and partially
substituting for traditional press coverage of competition law and
policy matters. There is a plethora of forums for competition law topics
and well as numerous individuals who post on Twitter and/or link to
news stories published elsewhere as well as on other social media
platforms.3 07 There is even a substantial number of twitter posts about
the merits of so-called "#hipster" antitrust.3

08

The result is a vigorous debate about most issues of importance in
the competition law world and very few issues of any kind that escape
notice and comment in the antitrust profession. The more important
and salient of these issues also receive at least some general public
attention and comment suggesting that antitrust policy operates in the
spotlight, at least among lawyers and business people most directly
affected by the decisions and policies at issue. While competition policy
is an area of specialization, and competes with many other issues of
more life and death importance for the time and attention of the public,
it is heartening to see the number and resources of the actors in civil
society who devote time and resources to the promotion of what they
consider sound competition law and policy.3 09
305. E.g., Jonah Engel Bromwich, The Raisin Situation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/style/sun-maid-raisin-industry.html
[https://perma.cc/JU7W-V5BJ].
306. The world's most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data, THE ECONOMIST (May
6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resourceis-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/R23Q-Q8CA].
307. E.g.,
Spencer
Weber
Waller
(@SWeberWaller),
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/sweberwaller?lang=en [https://perma.cc/E8AX-JVGG]; Spencer Weber
Waller,
LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/in/spencerwaller/
[https://perma.cc/
Q7JW-C9JX]; Facebook Group for the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups/
104637465017/ [https://perma.cc/D95B-KEZ6].
308. Search Results for "#HipsterAntitrust," TWITTER, https://twitter.com/hashtag/
hipsterantitrust?lang=en [https://perma.cc/5MAP-SP5T].
309. Elizabeth Warren, Here's how we can break up Big Tech, MEDIUM BUSINESS (Mar.
8,
2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech9ad9e0da324c?subsource= GS-66368038294-warren%20for%20president-p-
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It is difficult to ascertain how much of this flurry of activity makes
its way into the general public consciousness. It is also difficult to
ascertain what is the optimum level of civil society engagement in
order to make antitrust policy more truly democratic. This section, like
most of the rest of this essay, provides more of a checklist of issues and
indicators for each jurisdiction to consider how to better involve the
public in understanding the value of competition and how it is enforced
at home and abroad. The increasing global scope of the on-line
discussion of these issues and the availability of materials and
training outside of national borders at a minimum suggests that the
national, regional, and international conversation and engagement is
on the rise.3 10
IV. A TAXONOMY FOR DEMOCRACY AND ANTITRUST

One way to view democracy and antitrust in a holistic manner is to
think about how values are created and how values are then enforced.
It is for the political branches to articulate those values in
constitutions, treaties, and legislation through accepted national and
international democratic processes. It is for the administrative
branches and the judiciary to implement these policy preferences
consistent with whatever discretion the political branches have
delegated to them in applying their technical expertise. The public
participates both as complainant, litigant, critic, and catalyst for
political change. Competition law and policy then returns to the
political branches to exercise periodic oversight to ensure that the
democratically enacted policy choices and values are respected,
implemented, and amended as needed.
This type of iterative feedback loop can be outlined as follows. This
system of competition law and policy creates a stable, but not rigid,
political economy equilibrium if each institution plays its assigned
roles. An oversimplified diagram of this interaction is set forth below.

344821541734&gclid=EAlalQobChMIoaT9hvv44QIVePjBx3EQqyEAAYASAAEgLdCfD
BwE&refcode=WFP2019-LB-GS-IL&refcode2=GS-66368038294warren%2Ofor%20president-p-344821541734 [https://perma.cc/L5UN-3BBT].
310. E.g., INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, Training on Demand,
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/training/ [https://perma.cc/M8D7-J35Z].
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While such a diagram is both over-stylized and oversimplified, it
helps focus on the respective roles of the multi-player system in most
legal regimes. In such a system, the players toward the top of the
diagram are the most overtly political actors and play the most direct
role in formulating the values for the competition law system. Value
creation evolves into value implementation. As the process continues,
the feedback loop is formed with civil society and related private actors
providing input and criticism requiring the more overtly political
branches of government to react creating a new cycle of value creation
and implementation. Thus, democracy and antitrust produces
democracy in antitrust and a virtuous feedback loop that is flexible
enough to evolve over time, yet stable enough to produce justice and
stability for the players in the system at any given moment.
Consider how this virtuous feedback loop plays out in the
hypothetical country of Westeros.3 1 1 While I created the antitrust
specific details and outcome of this hypothetical, it is based on events
in the series A Song of Ice and Fire, by George R.R. Martin, and recent
events that occurred in Chile and Argentina. Westeros is a large
prosperous country with substantial manufacturing, precious
minerals, and agricultural production. There is substantial interprovincial commerce and growing international trade and financial
transactions with nearby island nations. Until recently, Westeros was
a military dictatorship and the country was wracked with internal
conflicts and a war with a northern neighbor. While Westeros has been

311. See generally Westeros, A WIKI OF ICE AND FIRE http://awoiaf.westeros.org/
index.php/Westeros [https://perma.cc/BW4A-ND4A].
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restored to stable civilian democratic rule, seven families continue to
dominate the economy.
Westeros has no tradition of competition law, but wishes to consider
the adoption of a modern system of competition law and enforcement.
The government embarks on a multi-year study of competition
systems. It established a blue ribbon commission of ministers, private
sector representatives, domestic experts, and international advisors to
make recommendations for a competition law statute for adoption by
the legislature. The commission holds hearings and receives comments
and testimony from individuals, businesses, trade associations,
lawyers, economists, and professors that it posts on its web site. Its
draft report and recommendations are circulated among key ministers
and staff and is eventually posted again for public comment.
Additional revisions are made in response to these comments and the
package of bills as recommended is introduced in the legislature for
adoption.
The proposal establishes a series of absolute offenses that include
traditional hard-core cartel offenses, as well as resale price
maintenance. The law also provides for a series of relative offenses
that include other vertical agreements, abuse of dominance, price
discrimination, and mergers and acquisitions. There is no mandatory
pre-merger notification for mergers and acquisitions, but the
Competition Authority is given the power to challenge transactions if
there is a "substantial lessening of competition." Much of the language
and structure of the Competition Authority draws upon the
competition laws of the European Union and its Member States
because of the historical ties the EU enjoys with Westeros and the blue
ribbon commission's conclusion that EU style competition best fits
Westeros's needs.
The competition bill does not contain any single purpose or value to
be applied in the interpretation and enforcement of the new Act. The
preamble to the new Competition Act does contain broad language that
the purpose of the bill is to "protect consumers and consumer choice,
promote efficiency, prevent the abuse of dominance, and prevent the
exercise of undue economic power."
The proposal establishes a new Westeros Competition Authority
(WCA) that does not handle consumer protection matters. The WCA
has authority to bring civil proceedings before a newly created
Competition Tribunal against individuals and undertakings violating
the new competition law. The head of the WCA is appointed jointly by
the President and the Central Bank and confirmed by the Parliament
for a five-year term that can be renewed once. The head of authority
can be removed only for "cause" or "malfeasance in office."
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The WCA's budget is substantial and allows it to hire
approximately thirty-five lawyers, economists, and investigators in
addition to support staff to begin its work. The penalties are
administrative fines for undertakings up to 10% of annual turnover,
and individuals fines up to 100,000 Westeros silver stags. The WCA
may also seek injunctive relief to halt the alleged illegal conduct.
The WCA brings all proceedings before the new Competition
Tribunal composed of three lawyers and two economists appointed by
the President, Parliament, and the Central Bank. Appeals from the
Competition Tribunal are made to the Westeros Supreme Court.
Private parties may bring cases for single damages (with a loser pays
principle) before the Competition Tribunal. There are no provisions for
class actions or collective actions.
While the original blue ribbon commission's work attracted little
general public attention, the competition bill becomes more of a cause
c6lbre. Competition policy becomes an issue in both local and national
parliamentary
elections.
Trade associations,
labor unions,
corporations, consumer groups, and other ad hoc coalitions testify,
lobby, publish white papers, debate in the media, and publish
scholarly analyses of the proposed Competition Act. There are minor
amendments to the Competition Act that eventually passes more than
four years after the government first began to study the issue.
The WCA begins its work once the head of agency is selected and
confirmed six months later.3 12 She hires her staff over the course of the
next six months and begins to hold workshops around the country to
explain the new law to bar association groups, labor unions, University
law departments, trade associations, and other business and civic
groups. The WCA builds a dual language website and publishes a
variety of plain language guides for citizens and businesses to better
understand the Competition Act. The WCA also begins work on
horizontal merger guidelines. The WCA further establishes small
regional offices in Oldtown and Lannisport, the two largest cities
outside the capital, to assist with competition advocacy and case
investigations.
It takes almost eighteen months for the WCA to bring its first
enforcement proceedings. The WCA's first case is a straightforward
resale price maintenance case involving retail pharmaceutical
products. The case receives extensive publicity in the business and
general press because of the wide range of products and medicines
involved. The Competition Tribunal finds liability based on the written
312. The Westeros Competition Authority more or so less follows the game plan set forth
in William Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems:
Explaining Variationin the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 85,
122 (2016).
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contracts between the pharmaceutical companies and the drugstores
which pre-date the adoption of the Competition Act, but continued in
effect up to the filing of the case. Over the objection of the WCA, the
Tribunal imposed a relatively small administrative fine of 50,000
silver stags on each of the pharmaceutical companies despite their
extensive turn over in Westeros. Neither party appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The second case involved a merger challenge to the combination of
two regional supermarket chains in the southern most province of
Dorne that would have established a firm with over 75% of the market
for retail groceries and even higher market share for the retail sale of
certain spices, fruits, and wines from the Dornish region. This
unconsummated transaction was abandoned by the parties once the
WCA challenged the acquisition. The WCA published a statement
outlining the publicly available evidence it would have used to show a
substantial lessening of competition.
The third of the initial wave of enforcement actions involved a
dominant energy provider who refused to interconnect with
competitors. Both the WCA and the respondent extensively cited cases
from the United States and the European Union as precedent for the
Competition Tribunal to apply in this case of first instance in
Westeros. Ultimately, the Competition Tribunal held that it lacked
jurisdiction and that the matter must be resolved by the sectoral
energy regulator. As a result, the Tribunal also dismissed private
damage claims by competitors that were also pending before the
Tribunal.
The WCA also began activities in competition advocacy matters. It
submitted comments and testimony on two bills before Parliament
that would have negative consequences on competition in the retail
and manufacturing sectors. It also submitted comments to the
transportation sectoral regulator regarding the entry of Uber, Lyft,
and local ride sharing services and their procompetitive potential if
properly regulated to protect consumers. The WCA also began
participating in international organizations such as the International
Competition Network, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and contacted Bravos, a key regional trading partner,
about the possibility of negotiating an antitrust cooperation
agreement.
Throughout the year, the head of the WCA and senior staff held
press conferences, issued press releases, spoke at industry and
academic events, and published articles about the enforcement and
other actions of the WCA in various business magazines and general
circulation newspapers. The WCA's performance in its initial years
was debated extensively in legal journals, newsletters, and at
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conferences organized by the bar associations and new competition law
centers established at the University of the Vale and Highgarden
Tech. These and other Universities began to increase courses in the
competition law area and the University at Winterfell has begun to
explore creating a master's program in competition and consumer
protection.
Changes in Westeros politics eventually produced a new free
market liberal President and Parliamentary majority. Oversight and
budget committees reviewed the WCA's first two years and pressed the
head of the WCA for her priorities for the coming years. While refusing
to discuss pending matters, the head of authority indicated that she
favored focusing on hard-core cartel cases and more closely monitoring
mergers and acquisitions, particularly between companies affiliated
with the major families of Westeros who continued to consolidate their
holdings and increase the interconnections between their business
empires.
A new round of competition amendments are prepared by the
President and the various Ministries with the input of the WCA. As a
result, maximum resale price maintenance was removed from the list
of absolute offenses, a new leniency procedure is instituted to assist in
the anti-cartel campaign, and a new provision is added barring
interlocking directorates under certain circumstances. Provisions to
add criminal penalties and class actions were discussed, but not
included in the package of amendment ultimately passed by the
Parliament. Thus, the feedback cycle begins anew with consideration
and adoption of external values undertaken by the more democratic
institutions and the faithful implementation of those values by the
more technocratic institutions in a fair and transparent manner.
V.

CONCLUSION

Democracy is fundamentally a set of norms and institutions.
Competition fits into the fabric of democracy by promoting a plurality
of actors and voices in the market and enforcing rules enacted by
democratic institutions in an expert, fair, and nondiscriminatory way.
The political branches create competition rules, remedies, procedures,
and institutions though open debate in accordance with the values and
procedures of each society. Public competition agencies enforce these
laws bound by norms and rules of administrative law and judicial
review. Courts review agency actions to ensure fidelity to the
established statutes and procedures and provide avenues for
participation by those affected most by the decisions. At the same time,
courts defer to the expertise of agencies if the agencies have acted
reasonably and provided due process of law. Private rights of action
allow the people most affected by the alleged harms to take matters
into their own hands to obtain compensation, both after the
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government has challenged wrongdoing and when the public bodies
choose not to act. Class or collective actions allow for compensation of
private rights when damages are small or inertia otherwise prevents
individual plaintiffs from bringing individual cases. These
developments are then analyzed, debated, and advocated in civil
society to influence the law and the enforcement priorities going
forward. In so doing, the law ensures that both private and public
power is not abused, recognizing the promise and the limits of
competition law and democratic market economies.

